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THE FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION
(Concluded)
By

SAmUEL EARNsHAW*

III
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FFDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION

Tm ADWmINISTRATION OF THE EMERGENCY ACT

The administration of the Emergency Act, like the great
part of all government administration through administrative
agencies, was undramatic and unsensational, but none the less
important and effective. Attention will first be directed to the
background and quality of the man who was Federal Coordinator of Transportation during the three year period. Not only
had he more than any other individual presented and developed
the nature of and necessity for coordination in transportation,
but also he had a strong hand in moulding the Act itself. His
work directed toward the reorganization and rehabilitation of the
railroads was magnified many times by the Coordinator machinery which he established in accordance with the Act, and, though
the power to order Was scantily exercised, the many reports and
recommendations for legislation that appeared bear witness to
the effectiveness of this machinery. These are to be considered
in turn, and, finally, a hasty survey made of the instances where,
by the sheer force of personal contact between the Coordinator or
one of his staff members and the appropriate person supported
by the persuasiveness of the good sense of the proposed idea
itself, as backed up by studied facts, progress has been made
toward the desired ends.
On the day the Emergency Act went into effect, the President appointed to the office of Federal Coordinator of Transportation Interstate Commerce Commissioner Joseph Bartlett Eastman.7 9 He had been a member of the Commission since February
27, 1919, when President Wilson had appointed him at the sug* New York City. B. A. 1933 Yale, LL. B. 1937, Harvard Law School.
'By Ex. Order No. 6196 of July 6, 1933, Coordinator Eastman's
appointment was officially proclaimed and he was relieved from his
duties as Commissioner to the extent required by his new office.
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gestion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, with whom he had been associated six years before in connection with the investigation of
New England railroads by the Commission.80 Before coming to
the Commission he had had opportunity to become familiar with
street railway companies and other public utilities as Secretary
to the Public Franchise League in Boston for seven years, following which he was a member of the Massachusetts Public
Service Commission, having been appointed in 1915. That he
gained the respect of the railroads generally is demonstrated by
the fact that they gave him strong support, as did many other
organizations, when his reappointment was contested in 1929.81
No man was better qualified to undertake the task of organizing the Coordinator's office and carrying out its work than
Commissioner Eastman.8 2 The combination of intimate acquaintance gained with the problems of local regulation in Massachusetts and fourteen years of experience marked by "h igh competence and great service" on the Commission afforded background
for the administration of this office of the highest quality. His
stand on the great policy questions of the day has always been
clearly defined and fully considered. Very marked is his leaning
towards concentration of power in the Federal Government over
railroads and associated transportation industries. In a brief
submitted to the Commission in 1913 in the New England Railroads Case8 3 he concluded :4
"One lesson which this history teaches is that the Federal Government must extend the scope of its supervision and regulation over
Interstate carriers."

His suggested remedies in that case, which were substantially
adopted by the Commission in its report 8 5 are interesting:
"1. Federal supervision over capitalization and the issue of securities
by interstate carriers.
"2. Federal limitation and regulation of the power of acquiring and
holding stock and the securities of other companies.
"3. Federal supervision of all subsidiary companies and enforced publicity, by this means, of their affairs:'
KNew England Railroad Investigation, 27 I. C. C. 566 (1913).
61See Harvey Mansfield, "The Lake Cargo Coal Controversy",
pp. 186-187 (1932).
82C. A. Miller, "Joseph Bartlett Eastman", 5 Ga. Washing. L. R.
652 (1937).
327 I. C. C. 560 (1913).
81Brief submitted by Joseph B. Eastman, Re Investigation in the
Matter of Rates, Classification, and Practices of Carriers. KNew England Railroads, May 15, 1913.
T
0p. 616.
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The emphasis placed on publicity as a sanction, that appears
in Point 3, suggests what will be found to be true later on,
Eastman's recognition of the all-important role played by public
opinion in any question of relationship involving government
regulation.
His strong adherence to the philosophy suggested above
86
coupled with his hard-headed independent thinking on problems in a field with which he is thoroughly familiar and in which
he sees further significances, has led him to be distinguished as
So a commentator,
"the great dissenter of the Commission."
remarking on his 400 dissenting opinions and his 200 odd opinions for the Commission sums up his approach as a Commissioner
in this way :87
"A consistent thread runs through his decisions. He has condemned control of the railroads by holding companies, criticized fees
and charges paid out in the reorganization of bankrupt carriers, and
again and again since 1920 he has urged the policy he emphasizes as
Coordinator-that the railroads must modernize their rates and services to keep pace with the new forms of transport."

Not inconsistent with this is his strong advocacy of the
ss
prudent investment theory of valuation and his opposition to
89
no-par stock, and his constant insistence on adherence to the
90
letter of the basic statute in administration.
keenly aware of the nature of the administrative
lWhile
process in the hands of the Commission, 91 and deeply convinced
of the need for the extension of Federal control beyond the limits
8 Of the 44 men who have sat on the Commission, Eastman is the
only one whose political affiliation is recorded as "Independent".
mR. G. Sucher, "Eastman of the Railroads", 43 Current Hist. 253,
254 (1935).
sPetition of National Conference on Valuation, 84 I. C. C. 9
(1923).
stock
of El Paso d S. W. Co., 70 I. C. C. 208, 209, 210 (1921).
9 For example, in Acquisition by Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. Co., 150
I. C. C. 81 (1928).
9"In determining such questions (referring to determination of
valuation question) knowledge of pertinent facts and an experience
which makes it possible to visualize the probable results of a particular public policy are quite as important as familiarity with the
law books. It is an instance in which the law is influenced if not governed by the facts. When, therefore, the question relates to the constitutional limits of the public regulation of railroads, an intimate
knowledge of railroads, of their relations with and their importance
to shipping and investing classes and to the public generally, and of
their past history and future prospects becomes of the highest consequence. Such knowledge it is the peculiar duty of this commission
to acquire." Excess Income of St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co., 124 I. C. C.
3, 50-51 (1927).
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of the enactments, Commissioner Eastman always stood out
firmly for the protection of a certain area of judgment in management into which no invasion should be tolerated as long as
the railroads were privately operated under the Interstate Commerce Act. In Reduced Rates, 1922,92 in discussing the propriety of the Commission ordering a reduction in passenger fares
he said:
"This, however, is not a matter which can be determined with any
degree of certainty. It is rather a question of business judgment or
wisdom. One of the chief objects of the return of the railroads to
their private owners was to reap the advantages of the exercise of
private initiative. While public regulation is necessarily an interference with management, it was not the intent of the act, as I read
it, that we should substitute our judgment for the judgment of managers under such circumstances as these."

It is known that this attitude was the same with reference to the
similar passenger fare case decided by the Commission in 1936, 93
although he did not sit on the case when it was before the Commission on its merits. Accordingly, it would be inaccurate to
cite Commissioner Eastman as an advocate of more regulation
of every kind. His leaning, and it is only a leaning, not a relentless, metallic, inflexible compulsion, is subject to this very important qualification when the question of affirmative management is concerned, and his whole attitude towards the Emergency Act, although it has been demonstrated to have conferred
very full powers of affirmative management, bears out the fact
that in this as Coordinator his inclination did not change. As
long as the railroads were under private management, they were
to be the managers within the limits set by the minimum necessities of regulation. On the occasion of his appointment as Coordinator Mr. Eastman attempted to allay the fears of those who
suffered trepidation at the thought of his sympathies for government ownership and at the same time of those who feared a dictatorial exercise of the granted powers by issuing a statement
including the following :94
"The Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933, does not pretend to be a complete or final answer to the transportation problem of
the United States, nor does it put the railroads under the control of a
- 68 I. C. C. 676, 740 (1922).
"Passenger Fares and Surcharges, 214 I. C. C. 174 (1936). Commissioner Eastman sat only on a subsequent petition of the carriers
for a suspension of the order in order to allow a substitute experiment
on their part. (57 T. W. 773.)
W June 16, 1933, 51 Traf. Wld. 1261.
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Federal railroad czar ...
it sets up a Federal Coordinator of Transportation, who is not to manage the railroads, but whose duty it Is,
with the aid of the Interstate Commerce Commission, to help the
railroads in exploring all possibilities for the avoidance of waste....1"

On the one occasion when a major order was issued the
Coordinator seemed to go beyond this, or at least he was criticized for so doing,95 but it is submitted that that was just one
occasion, and the circumstances there were almost unique. An
isolated instance like this may or may not be of any significance
or aid in forming a judgment as to the trend of a man's thought.
With this brief review of the administrative philosophy of Joseph
B. Eastman, it now remains to turn to an examination of the
work accomplished under his guidance and leadership.
In discussing the various phases of the administration of the
Act by the Coordinator it will be more convenient, for most purposes, to treat the three-year period as a unit, rather than to
pause over chronological niceties which are now without significance. For example, the chart of the Coordinator's organization
as set up by January, 1935, given herewith, 96 is not an accurate
picture of the organization in any of its stages of development

except the state reached in that month, which was the stage of
greatest extension, yet it will serve well enough for the purpose
of indicating just how the Coordinator attacked the problem of
setting up an organization.
The chart itself needs but little comment. Any mechanical
static picture of this kind of a functioning organization is bound
to be misleading, but in the main this chart shows the type of
organization that was set up. Its most noticeable feature is, of
course, the completeness with which the staff is given over to
research. Only the regional directors and the executive assistants appear to have a normal function of administration as such,
though in the course of events, minor executive duties fell to the
lot of other staff members.
The field of research and study is divided up amongst the
five special sections and the Research Staff, which latter is the
catch-all for problems not falling under one of the other heads
and some that do. The various regular advisory committees
Infra, pp. 305-308.
9OMechanical difficulties forbade the reproduction here of the
chart referred to, which was taken by Mr. Earnshaw from 98 Railway Age 116 (1935).-Ed.
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of railroad men which appear at several points on the chart
served to afford the regular staff the technical assistance they
needed in the course of dealing with general problems of policy
and attack. Similar to these were special advisory committees
who were usually called on to deal with particular problems, such
as the informal Advisory Committee on the Passenger Traffic
Report of the Section of Transportation Service, which consisted
of three University professors, two motor bus men, and six railroad executives.
The positions described above were filled by the Coordinator,
for the most part, with railroad men. From the very start it
was apparent that the total of available funds would be small
and that in consequence, the burden of the work would have to
fall elsewhere, either on the railroads or on the Commission. The
Coordinator selected for his staff only experts of the highest
standards. Many were high railroad officials, the great majority
of the others were closely connected with the transportation
industry. The shortness of the term to be served and the high
appeal of the call to service in the moment of national emergency
undoubtedly made possible the Coordinator's securing of exceedingly able men from the entire country. 97
It was recognized from the start that the Coordinator would
have to lean mainly upon the Commission for assistance in a good
many ways, particularly as to personnel. A few men were transferred permanently to the Coordinator's staff. Others were
loaned for specific purposes. In addition, clerical and other
staff help was loaned to the Coordinator for varying periods of
time.
In sum, the Coordinator, favored by circumstances, secured
within a remarkably short time an expert, well-organized staff,
1A random list of those in the first class mentioned would be:
J. R. Turney, Director, Section of Transportation Service, vicepresident of the St. Louis Southwestern Railway, H. J. German, Eastern Regional Director, president of the Montour Railroad, M. J. Reynolds, Assistant to Director, Section of Trans-Pacific Company, V. T.
Boatner, originally Western Regional Director, president Chicago
Great Western Railroad 1929-31; and in the second category: Leslie
Craven, Counsel, valuation counsel to the western railroads 1919-1932,
R. L. Lockwood, Director, Section of Purchases, Department of Commerce and consultation work, W. H. Chandler, Eastern Traffic Assistant, active in traffic work, Otto Beyer, Research Department, later
Director, Section of Labor Relations, consulting engineer as to labor
relations, and John L. Rogers, originally Executive Assistant, special
examiner for the Interstate Commerce Commission.
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well able to deal with the major task of research which was its
major assignment, reinforced by continuous free access to the
technical resources of both the railroads and the Commission.
While under this organization there was a high degree of
centralization in Washington, there was also local representation
in the field. The Coordinator's representatives were to serve
both in aid of localized study and in the execution of final plans
formulated by the central organization in Washington, being able
to act from the vantage point of being on ground with which
they were already familiar.
In anticipation of final action on the Act by the Congress,
the railroads had set up "economy committees" to deal with
problems of waste. When the Act was passed, these committees
were not abolished. The regional committees which were set up
under the Coordinator's supervision in accordance with the
terms of the statute bore a strangely close resemblance to them
and were dominated by the same strong men of the railroads.
The work of these committees, which fell far below what had
been expected of them, will be discussed incidentally later, aud
it is only necessary to point out here that their short-comings are
not traceable to any organizational defects, but, on the contrary,
the machinery provided for interchange of information was perfectly adequate for all demands made upon it. When the Association of American Railroads was formed at the end of 1934, it
superseded to a large degree the committees as the connecting
body between the Coordinator and the carriers.
Turning now to the formal orders issued by the Coordinator,
the three minor orders issued need but little comment.0 8 The
99General Order Number 1, issued July 1, 1933, requested certain
basic employment data from the railroads, necessary for the Coordinator in the enforcement of the labor provisions of the Act. (See
mimeographed copy of order issued by Coordinator, or 52 Traf. Wld.
140.) Among other things, the railroads were required to furnish figures monthly showing employment by occupational group and the comparison of these with the corresponding figures for May, 1933. This
order remained in effect until vacated by the Commission in July,
1936, when there was found to be no further use for these figures,
the labor provisions having expired with the Emergency Act the previous month. (101 Railway Age 157.)
The second order issued was Special Order Number I, issued July,
1933, in connection with the consolidation of the accounting work of
the Boston and Maine and Maine Central Railroads involving the
transfer of 115 employees from Boston to Portland and approximately
118 from Portland to Boston, all of whom applied for compensation
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most important order issued was one issued on October 25, 1934,
the effect of which was to prevent two southern railroads 9 operating segments of a Chicago-Florida passenger service through
Evansville, Indiana, from transferring their interchange of
through passenger cars at that point from one railroad, the Chicago & Eastern Illinois, to another, the New York Central.
In its original complaint to the Coordinator, the complaining road, then in trusteeship, had detailed the wastes and duplication which would inevitably follow the contemplated action, if
taken. The opposing roads had stated in the response they submitted to the three committees, that the service offered by the
complaining road was detrimental to their own operation of the
route, in respect to such matters as solicitation of business, preference in obtaining equipment from the Pullman Company,
speed, and the handling of advertising. In rendering a report
favorable to the three defending railroads there can-be no doubt
that the joint meeting was influenced by the presence of the
presidents of two of these, who partook actively in the Executive
Session held after the representatives of the complaining road
had gone. The conclusions were stated in four brief paragraphs,
of which the first stated that "in view of the decline in the
standing of the existing Dixie Route" and "the opportunities for
retrieving the loss. . . . by a stronger connection" the commitunder Section 7(d) of the Act. (By an aggreement made effective
July 1, 1933, the payroll and time-keeping of the two railroads was to
be done by the Maine Central at Portland and all other accounting
done by the Boston and Maine at Boston. Although seventy employees
were dropped as a result of this move, they were afforded no relief,
nor did they apply for any, as the reduction was not "by reason of any
action taken pursuant to the authority of this title." (As required by
Sec. 7(b) of the Act. This interpretation is given by the Coordinator
in Expenses and Property Losses Growing Out of Transfer of Employees of Boston & Maine and Maine Central Railroads under Section 7(d), Title I, Emergency Railroad TransportationAct, 1933, p. 1 of
mimeographed report, and rest on the assumption that the action was

taken independently of the Act and in good faith, though this was not
expressly stated.)

However, Section 7(d), the pertinent section, was

given a broader construction, the comparable words being "in carrying
out the purposes of this title", and an order was issued appointing an
examiner of the Interstate Commerce Commission to hold hearings

and take testimony regarding, or "otherwise determine" with the aid
of a land appraiser of the Commission, the expenses and property losses

of the transferred employees, and to report his conclusions back to
the Coordinator. This order was cancelled by Special Order Number 2

owing to the voluntary settlement of the controversy by the parties.
(See mimeographed report that title, Oct. 9, 1933.)
" The Louisville & Nashville and the Nashville, Chattanooga &
St. Louis.
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tees believed the three companies to have "the right to establish
through passenger car service as proposed," the second that
"substantial advantages" would accrue to the through service
if the change were made, the third that apparently neither
material capital expenditure nor increased maintenance expense
would be necessitated, and the fourth dismissed as irrelevant the
question as to whether the existing train service on the Chicago
and Eastern Illinois would be maintained after any change. It
is submitted that during the deliberations leading to this decision
language like the following (in the answering statement by the
defending railroads) must have met with sympathetic response
in the committees, judging by the whole rfavor of their action:
"The question here is the wisdom, propriety, and public interest
in substituting the New York Central Lines for the Chicago and Eastern Illinois over that part of the Dixie Route between Chicago and
Evansville.
"Heretofore, the many changes made in the Dixie Route have
been considered matters entirely within the judgment of the managements of the interested carriers. It is believed that the same considerations apply to the present situation, and that the question in Its
ultimate form is whether the managerial judgment is to control or
whether public authority shall substitute its opinion, not in a matter
of public regulation, but in a detail of management."

The Coordinator based his decision on an administrative
finding that the facts as asserted by the complaining road were
true, that the result of the proposed change would be duplication
of service, that the financial interest of the Chicago and Eastern
Illinois vitally affected the public interest, and that under the
statute he was bound to issue the order "in furtherance of the
purposes of Title I. . . .and for the protection of the public
interest." 0 0 Significant is his language at page 5 in answer to
the above contention:
"All public regulation is necessarily an interference with managerial discretion, but it is clear that as a matter of policy such regulation should be held to the minimum required by the public interest.
Prior to the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933, It was not
the policy of the Federal Government to undertake any control for the
purpose of eliminating or avoiding such evils as 'unnecessary duplication of services' and 'wastes and preventable expenses.' In order
'to foster and protect interstate commerce in relation to railroad
transportation by preventing relieving obstructions and burdens
"In the Matter of the Proposal of Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. to Discontinue Interchange of Through Passenger Train
Equipment with Chicago i Eastern Illinois By.Co. (Charles M. Thomson, Trustee) at Evansville, Indiana, and to substitute such interchange
with the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. (The
New Yorlk Central Railroad Company Lessee) (mimeographed), p. 11.
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thereon resulting from the present acute economic emergency, and
In order to safeguard and maintain an adequate national system of
transportation' the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933,
was passed. For a temporary period, under existing emergency conditions, the Federal Coordinator of Transportation was given power,
subject to the review of the Interstate Commerce Commission and if
the railroads would not act voluntarily, to require the elimination or
avoidance of the economic evils above mentioned, among them."

In conclusion, the Coordinator found that on the facts
before him, he was bound to issue the requested order, pointed to
a similar situation between Chicago and St. Louis where the
railroads had voluntarily, under the guidance of the Commissioner of Western Railroads, 1 1 eliminated some trains under
analagous situations instead of putting on new ones, and stated
that he would welcome review of his order by the Commission.
He also suggested but did not rely on the possibility that this
involved the elimination of a through route and was therefore
within the proviso in Section 4. He had held no hearing of his
own, although his staff had made a separate investigation, and he
admitted it was possible the facts had not been sufficiently
developed. His disarming statement favoring review by the
Commission, reinforced by their haste to prepare for the winter
travel season, seems to have discouraged the defending roads
from appealing to the Commission. They carried the fight
directly into the Federal District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois (Eastern District), where, upon hearing on argument
for an injunction, their bill was dismissed. 10 2 This order is still
in effect (fay, 1937).
This order is important for several reasons. Since it was
his first important order, each step was handled by the Coordinator and his legal adviser with particular care. While the statute
did not make specific provision for this particular kind of case in
two respects: where the action that would cause the waste was
proposed action, to take effect in future, as opposed to practice
already established; and where the Regional Coordinating Committees took action but did not recommend an order by the Coordinator, but only inaction; the general language of the statute
and the broad purposes stated in the Act sufficiently embraced
the particular situation. Again, the Coordinator held no hearing before rendering his decision, but rather he relied on the
"'Supra,p. 194.
"'Infra, pp. 339-344.
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informal hearing afforded the parties before the regional committees and on the prospect of a full hearing before the Commission. Furthermore, he admitted in his opinion that he was
exercising governmental power in a way unknown to peace time
regulation. Here, then, was the only instance pointing towards
what might have been the normal functioning of the Coordinator
had not the labor restrictions been in the Statute and had other
circumstances been more favorable. Full administrative investigation, flexibility, ample opportunity for informal hearing and
presentation of argument, due attention to the public interest,
and a final act of judgment by a highly qualified expert enlightened by a constructive attitude of adjustment of interests as
opposed to one tolerant of destructive conflict, all these were
present, in striking illustration of the administrative process at
its best.
That there were no more orders issued by the Coordinator
than those described above may be explained by reference to
several factors. In the first place, the labor restrictions in
Section 7 constituted not only a huge practical obstacle to be
overcome, but also a tremendous psychological barrier to any
action on the part of the railroads.10 3 That actually the kernel
of this lies more closely to the latter than the former is suggested
by the experience under the section of the Interstate Commerce
Act which affords relief from the Anti-Trust Laws.' 0 4 For years
before its enactment railroad management had complained of
these laws as being the one thing that prevented their closer
cooperation to serve the public interest, yet after this provision
was enacted, no substantial action was taken.' 0 5 As has been
more than once pointed out, there was some play afforded even
by these restrictions, and small coordination projects might readily have been carried out, but the fact remains that they were
not, so it is necessary to look to the other factors. Secondly,
then, the railroads themselves, because of the labor factor or
some other soon lost their enthusiasm for the use of the machinery
set up by the Act. Until prevented by action of the Coordinator,
consisting of the publication of a statement in which he gave his
construction of Section 7(b) the railroads continued to work
10 For the Coordinator's wide (some thought unjustifiably so) construction of Section 7(b) see infra, p. 350.
4
11
1 Section 5(15), supra, p. 203.

1 Supra, p. 193.
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through their "economy committees" 106 for the obvious purpose
of avoiding the effects of that section. Thereafter they initiated
practically no action of any kind through the legitimate committees 0 7 or in any other way, and, while the railroads continued to be very helpful in the way of furnishing information
in response to Coordinator questionnaires, the measure of their
willingness to act and of their voluntary undertaking to fall in
line with the spirit of the Act was greatly limited.
In the third place, the Coordinator was from the start very
reluctant to issue orders. As has been pointed out, the provisions
for the stimulation of voluntary carrier action and for study
were the significant parts of the Act for him. He looked upon
the power to order only as a last resort. Accordingly, only after
long and careful study had been completed and the project
reviewed from every possible angle would he even consider the
issuance of an order, and even then, he was fully aware of the
importance of winning the cooperation of those whom it would
affect, to its successful execution.' 08 Because his own staff was
necessarily so limited, he had to depend on railroad managements themselves for assistance in carrying out projects. If
they were not sympathetic, there was little chance of success, and
it appears from the above that in general railroad managements
were apathetic at the very best, when it came to taking drastic
steps for change, 10 9 and this apathy is traceable in part to their
dismay over the labor restrictions in the Act. Therefore, the
conclusion presents itself that here was a combination of interrelated circumstances and factors, the net effect of which was to
hold in complete check any effective use of the power to order.
Only in extremely unusual situations, such as that in the "Dixie
Rote" case 11 0 could any intimation lie of its inherent
possibilities.
"' Infra, pp. 350-352.
107
In one instance the Southern Coordinating Committee asked the
Coordinator to require the railroads in that region to observe certain
principles with respect to constructing industrial sidetracks. (Summary of Work, p. 2.)
10 Coordinator's Fourth Report, 74th Cong., 2nd ses. House Doe.
394, 4.
0"Genuine power (the central problem in social relations), can
only be grown, it will slip from every arbitrary hand that grasps it;
for genuine power is not coercive control, but coactive controL"
M. P. Follette, "Creative Experience", XIII (1924).
-ftBupra, pp. 305-308

V. L. J.-4
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On a few occasions the threat of order was resorted to, to
accomplish more satisfactorily the desired ends of the statute.
On one occasion the Southern Coordinating Committee asked for
a general order in that area requiring conformity with certain
principles of the construction of industrial side tracks.' 1 This
information was conveyed to the appropriate carriers, but no
further action appears to have been taken. Another more important occasion was when eleven terminal unification orders of
"simple" projects 1 2 were prepared and submitted to the various
parties in interest. This was in the late winter and early spring
of 1936. During the first two years of the office the Coordinator
had confined himself to study and research, but now that the
great bulk of that undertaken was nearing completion, he prepared, slowly and painstakingly, to "translate into action" at
least some of the simplest recommendations proceeding therefrom. Accordingly, in his language, submitting the tentative
orders, a firmer note may be detected :113
"While the Coordinator would prefer voluntary railroad action and

has done everything to encourage such action, he is convinced that
the time has come to use the authority which the act has given
him.... The railroad machinery for handling these matters is apparently on dead center."

It is hardly surprising that public opinion was stirred up
to a remarkable degree as a result of these threatened orders. It
was particularly alive and articulate among the groups and the
communities to be affected directly. For instance, in Mechanicvile, New York, where a considerable number of employees
would have been affected had the threatened order been carried
out, mass meetings assumed riot proportions. The ranks of railroad labor across the country were stirred and the demand came
ever stronger for a dismissal compensation agreement, no action
having as yet been taken by Congress on the Coordinator's proposed legislation on the subject. The orders were never issued
owing to the fact that holding them in abeyance at the President's request during the period consumed by negotiations
between employers and employees over dismissal compensation" 14
-'Summary of Coordinator's Work, p. 2.
For example, at St. Augustine, Florida (2 railroads), at Mechanicville, New York (3 railroads), and at Worcester, Mass. (3 railroads).
100 Railway Age 243 (1936).
4
Agreement was finally reached on May 21, 1936, 57 Traf. Wld.
2
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brought them so close in time to the time of expiration of the
Coordinator's term, renewal of Title I being extremely uncertain,
that any supervision of their execution by him would have been
impossible, and accordingly the plan to issue them was postponed until June, when the Congress sealed their fate by failing
to extend the Coordinator's term of office.
On one other occasion the Coordinator formally resorted to
threats. In connection with the enforcement of Section 7(3) of
the Act, particularly the provisions forbidding the interference
with the free choice by the employee of his representative union,
the Coordinator threatened to prosecute unless certain procompany-union policies were abandoned.1 15 Although this provoked some opposition and comment, 116 it led generally to a cautious hands-off policy by the railroads in their relation with company unions.' 17 It is also known that not a few times during the
course of informal conferences held to discuss what action should
be taken regarding steps recommended in the Coordinator's
report the threat was uttered.1 18 *While the resort to this method
of provocation of carrier action proved about as abortive as more
direct methods, it has a place in this survey on account of its
importance in extending the power to order to an area converging
on that area where only persuasion as a device would be successful, that is, in breaking down the sharp line of demarcation between formal action by order and informal action by suggestion.
Fitting comment has already been made on the importance
of Section 13, both as reflected in the universal support it won
while the Act was still young in its own legislative process, and
in the nature of the organization established by the Coordinator.
It now remains to suggest the effectiveness of the vast work done
under it in the stimulation of creative thinking in transportation
circles.
u5 52 Traf. Wld. 1083.
5

For example, 52 Traf. Wld. 1167.
Coordinator was soon relieved of his responsibilities in this
connection by the enactment of the 1934 amendments to the Railway
Labor Act. (48 Stat. 1185.)
119In December, 1933, the Coordinator resorted to a threat to establish container specifications, when he found the railroads completely
non-cooperative as to this proposal, 54 Traf. Wld. 143.
"
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Striking at the outset is the great variety of problems dealt
with by the Coordinator's staff. 1 9 The studies were in most all
The names of the reports issued by the Coordinator follow:
Coordination
Foreign Experience with Transportation Control
(mimeographed).
Coordination Projects
Report on Economy Possibilities of Regional Coordination Projects (Terminals) .................................................

Second Report on Economy Possibilities of Regional
Coordination Projects (Terminals) ...............................

Feb. 18, 1935
July 12, 1935

Consolidation or Joint Use of Railroad Major Shops ........ June 16, 1936
Cost Finding
Cost Finding in Railway Freight Service ............................. June 5, 1936

Equipment
Steam Locomotives .....................................................................

Nov. 2, 1933

Depreciation- CP I ....................................................................

Dec. 22, 1933

Summary of Results of Questionnaire on Box Cars
.
Nov. 25, 1933
.
CP 1 .............................
Results of inspection of Freight Cars and Locomotives
by Bureaus of Safety and Locomotive Inspection of
the Interstate Commerce Commission .............................. Jan. 4, 1934
Freight Train Car and Retirement Program, CP 1, EastApril 2, 1934
ern District ..............................................................................
Freight Train Car and Retirement Program, Southern
.Feb. 15, 1934
District .................................................................................
April 24, 1934
Steam Locomotive-CP 2 ........................................................
Freight Train Car and Retirement Program, CP 1,
May 5, 1934
W estern District ......................................................................
Repair Costs on Locomotives, CP 3 ........................................ June 11, 1934
Freight Car Arch Bar Trucks with Cast Steel Side
July 23, 1934
Fram es ......................................................................................
Cross-Haul Movement of Empty Cars .................................... Aug. 3, 1934
Freight Car Pooling and Plan for Proposed Box Car
Oct. 23, 1934
Pool ............................................................................................
Movement of Box Cars, CP 1B ................................................. Dec. 18, 1934
Repair & Retirement of Freight Acts .................................. Dec. 21, 1934
Freight Car Ownership vs. Car Hire ...........................-..... Feb. 11, 1935
Freight Car Construction Costs ............................................

Feb. 25, 1935

Technical Improvements in railroad equipment, roadway
June 27, 1935
and structures .......................................................................
Nov. 27, 1935
Comparative Costs Steam Locomotive Repairs ........
Freight Car Supply, Effects of operation under Per
Diem Plan ...........................................................................

May 14, 1936

June 15, 1936
Container Report ........................................................................
Freight Traffic
Freight Traffic Report, Vol. I and Vol. II ............................. June 7, 1935
Freight Traffic Report, Errata, June 11, 1935
Freight Traffic Report, Vol. III, July 25, 1935
Aug. 2, 1935
Railway Traffic Organization .................
Freight Traffic Report, Appendix I .

.........

Freight Traffic Rep. Appendix III, May 20, 1936
Freight Traffic Rep. Appendix II, June 1, 1936

Nov. 2, 1935
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cases well-planned and thorough. As for their accuracy, which
has been attacked a good many times on particular findings or
technique, this present paper is no place for discussion of that,
but one very vital fact is suggested, that reports going out with

Labor
Application of N. R. A. to the Railroads ................................ Sept. 1, 1933
Cost of Railroad Employee Accidents .................................... May 21, 1935
Annual Earnings of Railroad Employees, 1924-1933 .......... May 29, 1935
Extent of Low Wages and Long Hours in the R. H.
A........................................................................
Aug. 2, 1935
Industry .....-Extent of Low Wages and Long Hours in the R. R.
Industry-Correction Aug. 12, 1935
Employment Attrition in the Railroad Industry .................. Jan. 27, 1936
Hours, Wages and Working Conditions in Scheduled
AMar. 31, 1936
Air Transportation ..............................................................
Extent of Low Wages and Long Hours in the R. R.
May 15, 1936
Industry ....................................................................................
Rules, Survey in Train and Engine Service .......................... June 10, 1936
Hours, Wages and Working Conditions, Water TransSept. 30, 1936
portation ..................................................................................
Hours, Wages and Working Conditions, Highway TransOct., 1936
portation ..........................................................................................
Dec. 5, 1936
Final Rail Labor Report ..............................................................
Merchandise Traffic
Merchandise Traffic Report .................................................... Mar. 22, 1934
Conclusions of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation on Merchandise Traffic .............................................. May 29,-1936
Passenger Traffic Report
Jan. 21,
Passenger Traffic Report ............................................................
Passenger Traffic Report, Appendix I and II ...................... May 3,
Views of Passenger Traffic Officers on Short Haul PasM ay 1,
senger Traffic ..........................................................................
Conclusions on Passenger Traffic .......................................... June 12,
Miscellaneous
Report on P. R. R.-Long Island Merger .............................. Oct. 2,
Railroad Owned Grain Elevators ............................................ Aug. 30,
Centralized Scientific Research for Railroads ...................... Oct. 16,
Clearing House for Railroads .................................................... Nov. 27,
Summary of the Work of the Federal Coordinator of
Transportation from June, 1933, to June, 1935 ............ June 12,
June 19,
Scrap Survey Report ................................................................
Railroad Fiscal Report .............................................................

1936
1936
1933
1934
1934
1934
1935
1935

June 25, 1935

July,
Supplies for Dining Cars ..................................................................
Handling of Railway Stores Material ...................................... Oct. 7,
M...........
arch 27,
Preservative Treatment of Railroad Ties ............. .
Report on Leasing of Railroad Grain Elevators ................ May 29,
Marketing Atlas of the U. S. (Same as Appendix III,
Frt. Traffic Report)
Transportation Subsidies: rail, motor, air, water:
direct and indirect
Short Line Railroads and Their Problems
Demurrage Bureaus

1935
1935

1936
1935
1936
1936
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the Coordinator's approval, because it was Coordinator Eastman's approval, could be considered dependable.
Each report, as published, contained a presentation of the
underlying data, either in tables or in other appropriate form, a
full and careful analysis of this data, and, finally, summarized
conclusions in the form of findings of fact and of recommendalost of the data had been gathered by elaborate questions. 120
to and painfully filled out by the railroads
submitted
tionnaires
such as shippers, pipelines, bus comparties,
and other interested
panies, and water carriers, it had then been collated and analyzed
by one of the Sections or the Research staff, and, finally, the
report had been written, usually by the Director in charge. Following hurried survey and approval by the Coordinator, it would
be transmitted to the Regional Coordinating Committees, if of
interest to them, for comment. On their returning the report with
comment, informal conferences between their members and the
Coordinator or his staff would follow, and attempts made to
formulate concrete plans of action along the lines suggested by
the report. This order was not always scrupulously followed,
but it does give the general picture of the method used and the
course followed in the formulation and publication of these
reports and the ideas contained therein.
*While there was no wholesale adoption of the specific recommendations or of the carefully worked out plans set forth in
the various reports, there was at least a noticeable response to
them. Osmosis of ideas is a slow process, particularly of new
and painful ones in the railroad world, and, therefore, the bitterly slow response met by the constructive parts of the reports
was to be expected. Naturally, such was not the expressed
answer to those parts of the reports that appeared to criticize
present management, and, unfortunately, the far too ample attention paid to vindicative attempts to defend against such apparent
criticism diverted attention from the real meat there contained.

I" For example, the Merchandise Traffic Report, the first of the
major reports, and probably the best received by transportation interests, contains, first the Letter of Transmittal by the Coordinator to
the Regional Committees (pp. III-IV), then a Memorandum to the
Coordinator by the Director of the Section of Transportation Service,
which made it, being largely an acknowledgment of the assistance
rendered by the various advisory committees (p. V), next, the statement of Facts and Recommendations in condensed form and following
this the text (with 464 annotations), and, finally, the Exhibits, sixtyone in number (pp. 23-422).
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The great bulk of the studies dealt with national problems as
national problems, which meant that a new perspective was
gained which had never been fully realized before. It was a
fresh approach, and consequently the new ideas and the new
formulations and suggested applications of old ideas were
myriad. In his First Report on Legislation' 2' the Coordinator
1 22
took up a note sounded by the Commission at an earlier date
when he urged 123 the carriers to form "a more perfect union to
deal with matters of common concern." Nine months later came
the formation of the Association of American Railroads, 124 which
must be attributed either to the stimulus of or to the provocation
of the Coordinator. This was formed on October 12, 1934 to
consolidate effectively the numerous railway executives' and
operating officials' committees and associations together with the
old American Railway Association. A charter was drawn up and
adopted which conferred on the executive committee powers comparable to those given the War Control Board in the American
Railway Association during the War. As has been already
suggested, the Association from this time forward supplanted
to a large extent the coordinating committees in the Coordinator scheme, and this was highly satisfactory in many ways,
since the added degree of concentration and specializatiov
afforded by it, as well as the facilities for executing coordination
projects afforded in its regional organization and in its close
connection with all railroad executives, offered to reinforce
ideally and to effectuate efficiently the Coordinator's work. In
other words, the Association could, if it would, strengthen the
main structure of the Coordinator scheme by the improving of
the work and function of the regional committees, and at the
same time provide the necessary machinery, mostly lacking in
the Coordinator's organization, to carry out the details in executing any project requiring railroad cooperation and supervision.
Under the supervision of the Association of American Railroads, a plan was devised and established to meet the condition
of exceedingly wasteful empty car haulage, brought into sharp
Sen. Doe. 119, 73rd Cong. 2nd Sess.
'"Fifteen Per Cent Case, 178 I. C. C. 536, 585 (1931).
See the
Commission's Comment on its formation, Emergency Freight Charges
(1935), 208 I. C. C. 4, 63.
1
At p. 33.
1m98 Railway Age 113.
121
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relief in the Coordinator's report on Car Pooling, which was
called the "Frozen

Per Diem Plan.'

25

In

addition several

terminal coordination projects were undertaken under the
Coordinator's stimulus, during 1936 ten such instances being
proposed and planned. 126 It may not be out of place to add
that the increased aggressiveness on the part of the railroads,
the improved quality and attitude of service so widely noticeable
on the part of the railroads since 1933 may in part be traced
directly or indirectly to the work of the Coordinator. These
instances cited as illustrations of the way in which the ideas presented in and suggested by the various reports did eventually
bring about action demonstrate how hit-or-miss, how sporadic,
and how unpredictable was the process by which these things
were accomplished. There was no formal mechanical translation
of ideas into action. There was only the puzzling yet constant
phenomenon of more and more knowledge and of uncontrovertable facts by the sheer force of their own uncontrovertability
getting themselves established inside houses where the doors had
been closed to them.
Of all the Coordinator's tasks, the one which from the start
was most certain to establish his name in the eyes of posterity
was that of seeking out new channels for the stream of regulatory
legislation. Empowered by Section 13 to "investigate and consider means of improving transportation conditions throughout
the country" and placed under a statutory duty to submit from
time to time such recommendations calling for further legislation to these ends "as he may deem necessary or desirable in the
public interest," the Coordinator found that this function required a slightly different approach from his other functions of
enforcing the Act, issuing orders in proper circumstances, and
studying the railroads' own problems. It required an analysis
of broad policies, both managerial and regulatory, and a careful
examination of their long range results. While the other studies
were conducted and functions performed in the light of and with
a concern for the national aspect of the particular problem, this
inquiry led him into an examination of the policy foundations
'Under this plan empty car mileage was reduced and accounting
costs cut by substituting for the elaborate inter-railroad individual car
interchange accounting fixed monthly payments based on a test period.
It is estimated that 14 million dollars were saved by it in 193355 Traf. Wld. 837, 57 Traf. Wld. 1101.
'101 Railway Age 732, 58 Traf. Wld. 912 (1936).
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against which the particular problems, even though national in
character, were projected and on which they rested.
In order to provide a satisfactory basis for more particularized study of policy questions, the Coordinator devoted much
of his first two years to the making of a comprehensive survey
of railroad operation, equipment, service, and rate policies, with
emphasis on those aspects encountered peculiar to the railroad
situation as a whole. 127 Clearly, the one primary question to
get out of the way was whether the railroads should continue to
be considered able to meet modern demands. Coordinator Eastman concluded :128
"The survey has not shown that the railroads are an obsolescent
form of transportation. It does indicate that the thing has happened
to them which has happened to many other industries with the progress of science and invention. A comparatively sudden but great
change In conditions has outmoded many of their ways of doing
business and accelerated obsolescence in their equipment and other
property. They can adjust themselves to new conditions, but the
process of adjustment will take time, will not be painless, and will
draw upon reserves of enterprise and initiative. At the end of this
process of adjustment lie reinvigoration and the creation of new
traffic."

These conclusions give strong indication of two assumptions
which underlie much of the Coordinator's work in discussing
and proposing legislation, that the railroads' troubles are primarily the result of their own managerial policies, and that the
overcoming of these troubles lies also with those who shape managerial policies. In other words, in regulation by government,
extremely important as it is, lies neither the cause nor the ultimate solution of the particular problems confronting the railroads. While it may aid in getting the railroads out of their
troubles, it cannot do the whole job. And legislation reaching to
the very depths of specific policy questions attendant on the
20
industry may be very effective in its own sphere.'
'-'As of January 21, 1935, the Coordinator's broad summary conclusions were, 1. That substantial reductions of operating costs were
possible; 2. That the use of motor types of equipment would be helpful; 3. That charges for accessorial and incidental services could be
adjudged so as to be compensatory to the railroads; 4. That the rate
structure should be adapted to competitive conditions-Third Report,
House Doe. 89, 74th Cong. 1st Sess., pp. 617.

I=
bid., p. 7.

Altogether five reports on legislation were submitted to the
Commission for transmittal to the Congress. The first dated January 20, 1934, and printed as Sen. Doc. 119, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., was
devoted to a general discussion of the railroad situation of the function of the Coordinator, the temporary extension of which it recom-
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Before turning to the kind of question that it had been
anticipated that he would deal with and the kind of question
implicitly meant in the preceding paragraph, the Coordinator
found himself compelled to examine the assumption on which
they rested, and so he sought to answer the question "is there
need for a radical change in the organization, conduct, and regulation of the railroad industry which can be accomplished by
Federal regulation?" Was the status quo a safe starting point
for dealing with the problems, or should an entirely new starting-point, radically different, be selected? After a careful and
thorough weighing of the needs, the possibilities, and the considerations urged by numerous interests and students, the
Coordinator answered the question in the negative. He first considered the alternative of public ownership and operation. Comparing it with proposals for large-scale and compulsory consolidations and with the suitability of the contemporary American
railroad policy for dealing with tle problem, he reached his
famous conclusion :13
"Theoretically and logically public ownership and operation meets
the known ills of the present situation better than any other remedy."

However, he was not ready to recommend immediate resort to it,
because of the financial condition of the country, and he was
content to outline for Congressional consideration a possible plan
for the acquisition of control over railroad properties by a govmended, and of the need for radical change in organization, conduct
and regulation of the railroad industry. The second, dated March 10,
1934, and printed as Sen. Doe. 152, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., considered
the problems of the regulation of competing agencies of transportation, and contained bills for the regulation of motor and water
carriers, and, in addition, a few minor amendments to the Interstate
Commerce Act. The third, reported January 23, 1935, and printed as
House Doc. 89, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., again reviewed the general
regulation situation, renewed the recommendations of the water
carrier and motor carrier bills and the minor changes in the Interstate
Commerce Act, and added recommendations for a dismissal compensation bill, for amendment of Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, and
for permanent and far-reaching reorganization of the Commission.
The fourth report, submitted January 21, 1936, and printed as House
Doc. 394, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., reiterated the earlier recommendations with little change, and strongly urged that Congress established
a permanent Coordinator of Transportation, to act as a specialized
agency of the Commission and, in addition, offered as a basis of discussion a proposed statute to facilitate unification. Finally, the fifth,
of April 7, 1936, was devoted wholly to consideration of a plan for
unemployment compensation for employees of all types of transportation agencies, which was to supplant the application of the Social
Security Act (49 Stat. 620) to carriers. 100 Railway Age 623.
21 Coordinator's First Report, supra, p. 30.
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ernment corporation and for operation of the railroads by nonpolitically-minded trustees. 131 The core of the proposal was embodied in a bill drawn up by the research staff at the request of
Senator Wheeler, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, which he introduced into Congress on April 15,
1935, and which was referred to a committee but never reported
upon.1 32 Another alternative was also set forth in some detail,
the so-called "Craven Plan," suggestive of that enacted in the
British Railways Act of 19.2113 providing for the gradual compulsory consolidation of railroads into a limited number of
systems.' 34
Having dismissed these alternatives as inapplicable at the
time, the Coordinator worked out what was really a less radical
but more complicated plan of expanding and improving on the
traditional many-colored, many-sided form of regulation. This
included proposed comprehensive regulation for water car
and motor carriers, for the expansion and reorganization of the
Commission, for the establishment of a permanent Coordinator,
and for the clarification of the status of and the protection of
railroad labor.
The Mlotor Carrier Act as proposed was enacted by the Congress and became law on August 9, 1935.135 It extended substantially the regulatory system administered by the Commission
over rates, service, and financial matters (including combinations, and the establishment in new business) to apply to "the
transportation of passengers or property by motor carriers
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce and to the procurement of and the provision of facilities for such transportation, "I" more particularly to common carriers, contract carriers
37
and motor transportation brokers.'
lz1Ibid, 82-84; Coordinator's Third Report, supra, 48-56.

S. 2573, 79 Cong. Rec. 5616-5617.
11-12 George V, 417 (1921).
'AFirst Report, 84-105, including discussion of the legal problems
involved, and an analysis of the Prince Plan, similar in many respects
to this plan, Third Report, 45-49. See also adverse criticism from the
point of view of the advocate of public ownership in I. Lipkowitz,
"The Railroads Versus Public Interest" (pamphlet, New York, 1936),
21-22.
'$The Motor Carrier Act, 1933. 49 Stat. 543.
' Section 202(b).
McCollester and F. Clark, "Federal Motor Carrier Regula''P.
tion" (1935, new edition forthcoming), and other materials cited in
Note on Motor Carrier Act (1937), 5 G. Wash. L. Rev. 791.
'

320
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The similar proposed "Water Carrier Act, 1933," which
was introduced into the houses of Congress simultaneously with
seven others of his measures on February 4th and 5th, 1935, at
the request of the Coordinator, 188 conferred comparable powers
Legislation Recommended.
Amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act:
1.

To enable the Commission to prescribe
minimum as well as maximum joint
water rates, and to establish through
joint rail-water rates where deemed
necessary in the public interest regardless of the "short-hauling" of any
carrier.*

2d, 3d, and 4th ReNow before
ports.
Cong. as S. 1261 (75th
Cong., 1st Sess.)

2.

To include ports and gateways in the
protection of Section 3 against undue
preference and prejudice.*

2d, 3d, and 4th Reports, enacted Aug.
12, 1935, 49 Stat. 607

3.

To restore the Fourth Section to the
form in which it was prior to 1920.*

2d, 3d, and 4th Reports

4.

To shorten the statutory periods of
limitation with respect to reparation
claims to one year in the case of overcharges (and undercharges) and to 90
days in the case of all other claims.*

2d, 3d, and 4th Reports

Bankruptcy Revision Bill

3d and 4th Reports, enacted Aug. 27, 1935,
49 Stat. 911

Dismissal Compensation Bill*

3d and 4th Reports

Motor Carrier Act*

2d and 3d Reports, enacted Aug. 9, 1935, 49
Stat. 543

Reorganization of the Interstate Commerce
Commission*

3d and 4th Reports

Unemployment Insurance
tion Employees

April 7, 1936, Report
not printed Traffic
World
2d, 3d and 4th Reports

for Transporta-

Water Carrier Bill*

4th Reports. In 2d and
3d Reports (as part
of Water Carrier Bill)
* These starred bills were introduced into the houses of Congress
on February 4th and 5th, 1935, at Coordinator Eastman's request as
S. 1629-S. 1636, and as H. R. 5361-5365, 5378, 5379 (74th Cong., 1st
Sess.), 79 Cong. Rec. 1420, 1501.
Warfinger Bill

SUGGESTED

2573, H. D. 7541.
74th Cong., 1st Sess.

Government Ownership Bill (for Senator
Wheeler)

S.

To authorize the Unification of Carriers
(for discussion purposes)

4th Report
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over water carriers holding themselves out to transport people
or property in interstate or foreign commerce. 13 9 The reasons
prompting these measures have been suggested above. Some
regulation in the naturally monopolistic transportation industry
is absolutely necessary. The railroads by force of circumstances
have come to be subject to a high degree of regulation, if such
loose terms may be pardoned, whereas their chief competitors
have been subjected to very little by the Federal Government.
Unless the door is to be thrown wide open to the idyllic conditions
of free competition and laissez-faire, with the inevitable result
of control by monopoly, some degree of control by the government must be retained and in all fairness if one form is to be
so subject, the others also should be, unless particular circumstances free them of the evils. On the contrary, in these industries at this time particular circumstances seemed to increase the
evils, and in the chaotic and unstable conditions many interests
cried for salvation by government regulation.
Since the need for proposed reorganization of the Commission was contingent on the passage of the Water Carrier Act, the
Congress never had occasion to pass on it. The Commission,
however, characterized it as premature and uncalled for, urging
that the Commission itself should have full power and respon.sibility to reorganize itself.' 40 To this the Coordinator replied
that the latter should be the general rule, but this case was different, since (1) the character of the new task to be imposed
was radically different calling for basic changes, and (2) the
Commission was too much absorbed in its work and too much
divided in its own opinions to accord the enlarged question of
reorganization proper attention. 14 1 The proposal was to enlarge
the Commission to fifteen, to provide for a permanent Chairman
and for the specialization of function within the Commission
CRTICIZED AND REwarrTF

Railroad Retirement Act (the first)

Enacted June 27, 1934.
48 Stat. 1283

Railway Labor Act Amendments

Enacted June 21, 1934.

21 H. R. 5507, 59 Traf. Wld. 6115.

48 Stat. 1185

1
0 Letter from the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission transmitting (the Second) Report of the Federal Coordinator of
Transportation, Senate Doc. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
211Coordinator's Third Report, House Doc. 89, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 19.
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by establishing the following divisions: (1) Railroad Division,
(2) Water and Pipe Line Division, (3) Motor and Air Division
and (4) Finance Division. The chairmen of these were to sit
with the permanent chairman as the Control Board, which was
to pass on questions of general transportation importance and
which would have the duty of approving or disapproving the
formation of special divisions which the Chairman should appoint. Further, there was to be a permanent Coordinator, possessing broad discretionary power, who would take over the
Commission's functions of planning on a national scale and of
recommending general legislation, and who would take over the
temporary Coordinator's other functions under section 13 of the
Emergency Act, to act as liason officer between the Commission
and the other arms of the Government. Apart from the larger
scheme of which it was later a part, in his very first report,
Coordinator Eastman had suggested :142
"In my judgment, there should be an officer of the government,

with powers like those of the present Coordinator. However, I would
not yet make such an arrangement permanent, for it needs further
trial before it is given any final form."

In his Fourth Report among the recommendations there appeared, separate from the qualified renewed recommendation of
the reorganization measure, the following:
"4. Enact legislation for the creation of a Coordinator of Transportation associated with the Interstate Commerce Commission along
the general lines set forth in S. 1635 and H. R. 5365 (74th Congress,
1st session)."

The report also contained further discussion of the consolidation
problem, and in it a bill was submitted solely as "a basis for discussion" entitled "A Bill to authorize the unification of carriers
engaged in interstate commerce and for other purposes."
Significant were the amendments proposed by the Federal
Coordinator to the railroad provisions of the Bankruptcy Act,
which went into effect August 27, 1935.143 The effect of these
was to speed up procedure under that Act by relaxing the strict
requirement in all cases of the approval by two-thirds of the
stockholders and creditors in each group and by correspondingly
tightening Court power. The Commission was to submit a
reorganization plan to the court for approval before submitting
"'First Report, 34.
a 49 Stat. 911.
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simplified, and the
it to creditors. The valuation procedure was
144
Trustees.
of
choice
its
in
Court left freer
After a thorough study of the displacement of labor by
specific coordination projects and by labor saving devices and
of the other factors involved, the proposed bill for Dismissal
Compensation was written. It is important because the comprehensive scheme it set out and the method of compensation suggested strongly influenced the nature of the terms of the voluntary agreement reached by the national representatives of the
employers and of the employee on May 21, 1936. For members
of three wide age classifications the bill set up a scale of compensation, by lump sum for men under 55, and by annuity for
those 65 or over, with an optional arrangement in between,
graduated with service, providing an age differential, related to
earnings, and carefully articulated with the Railroad Retirement
Act, 145 which at the time was still thought valid. The threat to
secure passage of this bill, then under consideration by Congress,
was later used as a means to exert pressure on the railroad
employers during the subsequent negotiations commenced February 3rd.14 6
Additional recommendations in the broader related field of
unemployment compensation were submitted in the Coordinator's fifth report on legislation. This contained a study of the
effect of the Social Security Act 47 on the railroad situation and
proposals for a substitute plan.
While the Coordinator dealt with all of the important proposals mentioned above and also with some minor ones in his
reports on legislation, they by no means represent the whole
of his influence on the course of legislation. Both the original
Railroad Retirement Act 148 and the 1934 Amendments to the
Railway Labor Act,'4 9 (one effect of which was to supplant paragraph (e) of Section 7 of the Emergency Act dealing with employer restrictions on the free union activities of employees) were
presented to the Coordinator's staff for study and revision.
Reference has already been made to the numerous appearances
'"Leslie Craven and W. Fuller, "1935 Amendments to Railroad
Reorganization Legislation", 49 H. L. R. 1254 (1936).
14548 Stat. 1283.
100 Railway Age 555 (1936).
49 Stat. 620.
"48
Stat. 1283.
1m48 Stat. 1185.
1

"

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

of Coordinator Eastman before Congressional Committees.150
His opinion was greatly in demand as that of an expert who was
more than an expert. Rather, he was almost everywhere recognized as a man of great experience possessed of the widest familiarity with railroad matters, an almost overcautious hesitancy to
express any opinion unless all the facts were at hand, and, most
important of all, sound judgment.' 51 His position as chairman
of the Commission's committee on legislation doubtless added
even more to the demand and respect for the expression of his
opinion. 152 Although the extent of the Coordinator's influence
exercised in this way cannot be measured, it is submitted that it
was and is considerable, and that it has not been exhausted yet.
The informal semi-official work of the Coordinator and his
staff was by no means confined to the field of legislation. At the
very commencement of his term he was called upon by the
President to act as mediator in a dispute between the national
representatives of railroad employers and employees. The question was raised whether there should be an extension of the
temporary nation-wide wage reduction agreed upon at the Chicago conference the year before.
With the Coordinator's aid, the parties agreed to a oneyear extension of the existing agreement. 153 The following year
he was called upon to furnish his good offices again, at which
time the dispute was settled on a permanent basis.' 5 4 In addition to the part taken in these nation-wide settlements, it is important to notice the similar one the Coordinator took in connection with local settlements of problems raised by the execution of
coordination projects. On the Kansas City Southern Railway
issues involving the displacement and transfer of men arising
2"'Supra, p. 186.
See, for example, his testimony on the Pettingill Bill to amend the
4th Section of the Interstate Commerce Act (reported 57 Traf. Wld.
383, 439 (1936), on air carrier regulation, 56 Traf. Wld. 197 (1935),
and water carriers regulation, 57 Traf. Wld. 439 (1935)).
"'The Supreme Court has made some use of his work. R. R. Retirement Bd. v. AZton R. R. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 378, 381, 55 S. Ct. 758
(1935).

2Under Senate Resolution 71 (74th Cong.) the duty was imposed
on the Coordinator to select the roads to be investigated by the Special Investigating Committee (Senator Wheeler's Committee).

Accord-

ingly, July 5, 1935, he submitted names of 18 roads and on July 16,
1936, of 7 more, in addition to those of several banking houses.
55 Traf. Wld. 971, 56 Traf. Wld. 55, 57 Traf. Wld. 1201.
"'51 Traf. Wld. 1262 (1933).
1453 Traf. Wld. 809 (1934).
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out of a shift in operating arrangements were satisfactorily settled,'r 5 on the Pere Marquette he assisted in settling a dispute
over representation, 150 and the question of dismissal compensation was negotiated in connection with the arrangement made by
the Baltimore and Ohio to operate into Pittsburgh over the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie under his direction. 157 Reference has
already been made to the steps taken to enforce Section 7 (e) concerning company unions.
In addition to his accomplishments in the field of labor
relations, the Coordinator's comparable accomplishments in other
fields are noteworthy. The effectiveness of his staff in negotiating arrangements more satisfactory to the railroads was demonstrated in their achieving a degree of success in connection with
dockage and other similar agreements in the North Atlantic
Ports. 6r 8 The Coordinator personally acted in bringing pressure to bear on the steel industry in reducing the price of steel
rails from $40 a ton to $36.375, a matter in which the President
took a definite interest, and from the outcome of which the railroads derived benefit in the opportunity furnished to buy more
rails at an earlier time on account of the lower price and the
extra PWA funds made available because of the reduction. 159
Other informal matters of this kind were the facilitation of railroad purchasing of equipment, the stimulation of the formation
of voluntary committees between groups of competing carriers
for consideration of their joint problems, and, finally, the securing of voluntary reductions in salaries by railroad executives to
a maximum of $60,000 a year.160
Of the accomplishments last considered the reduction in
salaries, trifling as it was, constitutes perhaps the most significant, in at least one very important respect. Standing as a symbol
of the railroads' refusal to adjust themselves to realities and
consequently of their inefficiency and unresponsive attitude to'96
Railway Age 359 (1934).
'52
Traf. Wld. 594 (1933).
I. C. C. Finance Docket 10630 (1935), 55 Traf. Wld. 293. Liberal terms were granted displaced employees in a similar arrangement
on the Union Pacific System held to be without Section 7 by Coordinator Eastman, 56 Traf. WId. 230 (1935).
Summary of Work, 20-22.
Ibid, 35.
" Mention should also be made here of the simplification of interline accounting and settlements accomplished on the basis of a recommendation of the Coordinator. (Summary of Work, 17.)

K. L. J.-5
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wards the public in the eyes of the general public, high salaries
of railroad officials had to be reduced, and reduced in a conspicuous manner to counteract this bad impression and to win
back a large body of the public to a desire for a sympathetic
understanding of railroads and their problems. In this feat of
bringing about a restoration of the general public's interest and
confidence in the railroads, the Coordinator played a leading
part. After the passage of the Emergency Act a certain amount
of the pressure which had been worked up demanding action in
the situation had been released, with the result that the general
public had to some extent lapsed into forgetfulness of the continuing seriousness of the railroads' condition. When the
authorities in Washington sought to expend public work funds
elsewhere, Coordinator Eastman argued forcefully that they be
applied to the elimination of grade crossings.' 6 1 When pessimists foretold the doom of the railroads and bitterly attacked
them for their shortcomings, he turned on the attackers and
sounded a ringing note of hope and confidence :162
"Let me say . . . that I have no idea that the railroads are

approaching the status of the canal boat and the stagecoach, and that
I see no need for the industry to decline. The opportunities for
improvements in equipment, facilities, methods of operation, and service are very great. The worst danger is that full scope for these
opportunities will not be given."

The Coordinator represented a constituted powerful force
ever present on the scene hammering away at the shippers, the
water carriers, the motor interests, the chambers of commerce,
the labor associations and the general public to seek a deeper
understanding of the railroad problem than an approach to it
solely through its narrow aspects which touched them at first
hand would afford, by realizing its complex nature and national
character, and by seeking methods of improvement based on such
realization. He was a fountainhead of education and information; he was also a force seeking to bring all the parties concerned together. He made the people feel that the railroad
problem was their problem, and he started them on the way
towards its solution.
But that he thus took the part of the railroad industry and
a,Statement
Crossings."

issued August

2,

1933,

"Elimination of

Grade

1"Speech before the National Association of Mutual Savings

Banks, May 16, 1934.

53 Traf. Wld. 959-961.
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constantly affirmed his faith in its future by no means indicates
that he spared the individual railroads from criticism and severe
attack when he thought it was needed. From the first he was
aware that he was in a delicate situation, that to succeed he must
have railroad men with him, and yet what they must join with
him on was in the attack on their own ways of doing things. The
Coordinator started off very mildly, and ardently sought to win
the support and cooperation of all. 163 However, when in the
course of his duties some act was necessary which might antagonize the railroads, he never hesitated a moment to take direct
action. In August, 1933, to attempt to strengthen the support
of the Administration's policy of re-employment he sent telegrams to the president of every Class I railroad in the United
States requesting them to do their best to increase employment,
which must have been received unenthusiastically by some railroad men who looked to him to aid in discovering economies,
which to them meant cutting down on labor. In a letter to the
president of the New York Central Railroad in September of
the same year, the Coordinator showed no patience with the
vindicative attitude of that road when it urged postponement of
the Pennsylvania's attempt to experiment with store-door
delivery service.'0 4 Moreover, by February, 1935, a year and a
half later, he was openly expressing doubts as to the railroads'
desire to cooperate either with him or with themselves, after their
continued refusal to take action on his proposals. 0 5 A month
later he accused the railroads as being studiedly on the defensive
and of being more zealous to prove him wrong than to find constructive ways out of difficulty in his work,1 6 and the following
year stated flatly that the railroad executives were to blame for
the failure to succeed of the Coordinator's policies towards the
American railroads and that they had used Section 7(b), as an
excuse. At the same time he pointed out the basic trouble :107
1 1See for example, his first official statement, June 16, 1933,
51 Traf. Wld. 1260, and his first official speech, to the Springfield
Traffic Club and Shippers Advisory Board. Springfield, lass. Sept.
28, 1933, 52 Traf. Wld. 551.
1"52 Traf. Wld. 553.
1 Speech before the Hartford Chamber of Commerce, February 7,
1935, 55 Traf. Wld. 25L
"'3Speech before the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New
York, March 7, 1935, 55 Traf. Wld. 437.
'0 Speech before the Traffic and Transportation Association, Pittsburgh, Pa. Feb. 5, 1936. 57 Traf. Wld. 259.
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"At bottom, the trouble is that the managements think narrowly
in terms of their own particular roads, rather than in broader terms.
Quite naturally and quite properly they put the welfare of the particular road first and foremost. What they do not appreciate, as
I think they should, is the extent to which the individual welfare will
be promoted by action which is for joint benefit or common good."

It was the more unfortunate that this should be the state of
affairs at the time when the great bulk of the research work was
finished and the time had come to "translate its results into
action,''168 a process which was completely dependent on the
cooperation and favorable interest of the railroads themselves.' 60
The railroads not only objected to what appeared to them to be
the imposition from above of proposals which did not take into
sufficient account particularizing factors and individual "interests," but also to the way in which these proposals were presented. It was the Coordinator's custom to issue the reports to
the public at large at the same time they were submitted to the
railroads' committees, and therefore it was easy to interpret this
as an attempt to establish the proposals by the pressure of public
opinion rather than by virtue of their intrinsic merits. The railroads were always exceedingly helpful in filling in endless questionnaires submitted to them by the Coordinator, for which painful and thorough work due credit was given.' 70 In sum, the
Coordinator had the thankless task of trying to reconcile almost
irreconcilable points of view, of the users of the railroads with
their grievances, of the pessimists with their sinister predictions,
the antipathetic, unconcerned public whose interest was really
vital, remote though it seemed to them and, finally, of the railroads themselves with their apparent inability to face problems
11 See the Coordinator's Statement, 1935: "Now that much of
the work of research has been done, the time has come to translate
its results into action. This is possible. . . ." Summary of Work, 38.
"I Discussing the restrictive effects of Section 7, he continued,
"(This is possible) even if the present restrictions on reduction in
railroad employment remain in the law and are enforced. Because of
the steady attrition in railroad labor forces resulting from permanent
separations from service, the effect of these restrictions will only be
to delay the realization of economies. In time they can be fully
obtained, just as happened in similar circumstances in Great Britain,
after the consolidation of the railroads into four systems following
the close of the World War. In the event of an upturn in traffic and
railroad business, requiring in and of itself additional employment,
the economies could be realized very quickly, notwithstanding the
restrictions." Ibid., 38-39.
I" Coordinator's Summary of Work, 36-37.
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as national problems, their increasing tendency as time went on
to defend rather than to seek to improve, and their growing
impatience with the methods used by the Coordinator in attempt17 1
ing to spread the gospel of coordination.
Another basic relationship which gave rise to a number of
problems of its own was that between the Coordinator and the
Commission. Legally, the Commission was above the Coordinator, by virtue of its power of review over any order issued by
him, 172 and legally the Coordinator had few powers that the
Commission did not possess,17 3 with the most marked exception
the general dispensing power over the Anti-Trust Laws and other
laws, State and Federal, which the Commission only possessed
in connection with consolidations' and pooling. The Commission's chief reference was restricted to the maintenance of adequate, reasonable, and non-discriminatory rates and service,
whereas that of the Coordinator was to the more efficient management and the strengthening of financial structures of the railroads as a whole.' 74 The Commission's raison d'etre was to
protect the rights of the user of the railroads and the general
public, after, as well as before, the policy change in 1920, the
Coordinator's to encourage and assist the railroads themselves
out of these particular difficulties. The former dealt with cases,
weighing conflicting interests of shippers, of investors, of labor,
of management, of the State, against the background of the
"'Because most of his dealing was directly with railroad management, the Coordinator had less occasion to confer directly with railroad labor. His early expressions of disappointment at the restrictive
nature of Section 7 as finally enacted and his sharp note of warning to
labor that its fate was directly dependent on coordination on two occa
sions (Address before railway labor union officials, Jan. 12, 1935,
55 Traf. Wld. 111, and Address before Brotherhood of Railway and
Steamship Clerks, Nov. 9, 1935, 56 Traf. Wld. 799) did not strengthen
their support of his policies. Actually, when the protective Section 7
of the Emergency Act was rendered unnecessary by the agreement
reached on dismissal compensation (supra, p. 323) labor seemed to lose
interest in the further existence of the Federal Coordinator (infra,
p. 337.
1"1" Section 9 of the Emergency Act.
73Infra, n. 193.
"' Coordinator Eastman's feeling as to the function of his office
and its relation to the Commission's is indicated in the following
passage from his statement made on appointment as Coordinator:
"it (the Act) sets up a Federal Coordinator of Transportation who is
not to manage the railroads but whose duty it is, with the aid of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, to help the railroads in exploring
all possibilities for the avoidance of waste and preventable expense,
and to encourage and promote, and, if need be, require actions which
will have that result." 94 Railway Age 899.
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interest of the public, (and in general investigations the process
was much the same) whereas the latter dealt with, wholes, with
policies, with kinds of operating and managerial practices, with
technical questions, with legal questions, all in terms of national
change, and national improvement, focussed around the central
question, of how an efficient, paying national system of transportation was to be developed. To the Commission the broad lines
were important only as they threw light on the individual case
or investigation in hand, but to the Coordinator the broad lines
were the central concern, and the other factors only coloring.
Yet while the emphasis of each of the two agencies was different,
there were overlappings possible. The Coordinator had no power
over particular rates, yet it was his duty to study the general
rate structure and to recommend changes therein, and the Commission, while lacking power to control completely terminal practices, did make studies of possible economies by improvement
175
therein.
This contrast in method as carried out in actual practice,
putting aside the question of power, is well brought out by the
contrast between the Coordinator's "Passenger Traffic Report,"
(1935) (which dealt with the nature of the travel market, the
nature of service required by the public, the factors conditioning
the traveller's price, carrier sales promotion, and lastly, the
kind of service the nation's railroads were furnishing), and the
order issued in Passenger Fares and Surcharges1 6 where the
Commission, looking at the situation from the revenue standpoint
of these particular carriers, and weighing each of the above factors in relation thereto in order to make better service available
to the public, resorted to an order affecting but one item in the
picture, a very powerful one to be sure, yet in sharp contrast
to the general reordering and readjusting sought by the Coordinator from his approach. Here in this borderline situation the
ends, both immediate and long-range, sought by both coincided,
yet the Coordinator sought to attain them by means of a general
reformation of service and by a fundamental readjustment of the
rate structure, whereas the Commission had to content itself
with a single order, very broad in effect, dealing with one, but
'Ex Parte 104, Part VI, which was referred to Federal Coordinator at the inception of his term. Interstate Commerce Commission,
Annual Report, 1933, 29.
-- 214 I. C. C. 174 (1936), and see infra, pp. 335-336.
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only one, factor in the situation, the rate level. By their very
nature most of the other elements could not be dealt with by
order, and it was peculiarly the character of the Coordinator
agency to deal effectively with these.
As far as furnishing, equipment, and personnel went, the
Commission was the Coordinator's best source. The Commission cheerfully furnished office space and other facilities, rendered incidental services, and loaned its staff members on occasion. In August, 1933, it established rules, as directed by the
Act, for procedure in review of Coordinator orders. 177 In each
of its annual reports it referred to the work of the Coordinator
then in progress. 178 Each of the Coordinator's reports on legislation it transmitted to the Congress, as directed by the Act,
usually with but scant comment. 1 9 The Commission stood with
the Coordinator in most of his recommendations, but took a
strong stand in opposition to the proposed Commission reorganization plansO Again, it was difficult for a body like the Commission to sympathize with what was implicitly an assertion of
its inability to cope with a problem of reorganization in its own
way, according to long-established practice. Naturally, the Commission was desirous of being allowed to accomplish by itself any
reorganization necessitated by new demands. Accordingly, the
proposal was attacked as premature and better suited to treatment by the Commission itself than by Congress. There was but
one dissent.i8l
117
7 Interstate Commerce Acts Annotated 5975-5976.

178Annual Report, 1933, 4, 18-20, 29, 36, 68; 1934, 14, 15; 1935,
19, 41, 86; 1936, 14.
11 The first and fifth reports (supra, n. 129) were passed on to the
Congress without comment; the second was approved unanimously,
except as to the 4th Section (Interstate Commerce Act) amendment,
where two Commissioners dissented; the third met with Commission
approval, except as to the proposal to reorganize the Commission,
which was strongly opposed (one dissent), the dismissal compensation
bill being stated to be outside the Commission's power to approve or
disapprove; and the fourth report followed along after the third,
except as to the mere matter of a proposed change in the statutory
period of limitation for claims against the railroads, and the suggestion of the establishment of a permanent Coordinator (as to which
there was significant refusal to comment).
"I Coordinator's Third Report, House Doc. 89, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.,
VII-VIII, 4th Rep. H. D. 394, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., VI-ViI.
' Commissioner Miller, Third Report, IX. He was joined in his
dissent by Commissioner Caskie after his appointment, Fourth Report,
IX. These two commissioners also affirmatively urged the establishment of a permanent Coordinator.
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In the related proposal for the establishment of a permanent Coordinator the Commission was simply non-committal,
saying :182
"After three years' experience with this additional agency, with
complete reports before it, we believe that Congress is well advised
as to whether or not the office should be made permanent."
That is, the Commissioners, with but two exceptions, 8 3 did not
enthusiastically support the continuance of the Coordinator, but
they were unwilling to go so far as to oppose extension. While
this might be made to appear quite inconsistent with the stand
taken on the reorganization of the Commission, it would seem
that its significance should be limited to the fact that it demonstrates the latter's non-responsive attitude toward the office of
Coordinator, even though administered by one of its members.
There can be little doubt that there was a subconscious conflict
here, but one which probably remained subconscious.
In the matter of research, the relationship between the two
agencies was most satisfactory. At the opening of his term
certain unfinished reports were turned over to the Coordinator. 18 4 Reference to the latter and then back again to the appropriate bureau of the Commission was made as a matter of course
as to some matters. 8 5 There was similar exchange and use of
materials on the completion of reports. Just as the Coordinator
had made use of the earlier work of the Commission which
pointed out some of the landmarks in his field,' 8 1 so the Coordinator's work became useful to the Commission in its duties. His
reports and conclusions were referred to with some regularity.'8 7
In addition, in the course of business the Coordinator would turn
Coordinator's Fourth Report, Supra, VIII.
Supra, note 181.
""For example, Ex Parte 104, I. C. C. Annual Report, 1933, 29.
""The Commission's report on demurrage bureaus was prepared
by Director Bartels of the Bureau of Service, was referred by the
Coodinator to the coordinating committees, as strengthened by the
concurrence in the conclusions by his regional traffic assistants, and
after an "inadequate discussion" it 'was returned by the American
Railway Association. It was then sent a second time to the regional
coordinating committees for consideration-53 Traf. Wld. 643, 695;
54 Traf. WIld. 786.
""See note 31, supra.
38 For

example, see citation of his material four times in Enzer-

gency Freight Charges, 1935, 215 I. C. C. 439, 460-461, 216 I. C. C. 435,
439, 218 I. C. C. 4, 65, 497 (1935).
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over to the proper bureau of the Commission requests from the
18 8
general public of a routine nature.
In the passenger fare case of 1936 the Coordinator's Section
of the Transportation Service Report on passenger traffic was
heavily relied on.18 80 While the Coordinator did not participate
in this ease when it was being heard on the merits, he was called
on to act as Commissioner in breaking a tie on the occasion of
the railroads' petition to institute a compromise measure in
modification of the order already issued. He favored the enforcement of the original order on the ground that the railroads' proposal was of such a compromise nature that it would render
less trustworthy the experiment ordered by way of reduced
fares. " " Although he had few occasions to exercise his voting
power as a Commissioner, the fact that the Coordinator was
also a Commissioner influenced the relationship substantially.
Practically, the Coordinator was familiar with the Commission's
ways and machinery, and the result was the complete avoidance
of misunderstanding between bodies that comes more easily with
unfamiliarity with the other's ways. In certain other capacities
Coordinator Eastman was still Commissioner Eastman, for
example, in connection with certain accounting reform matters
commenced before his term and continuing on down after it.191
IFor example, the matter of requests by interested bodies to
restore to service abandoned railroad facilities. Annual Report,
1934, 72.
1
Passenger Fares and Surcharges, 214 I. C. C. 174, 180, 182, 240
(1936).
''57 Traf. Wld. 773.
'iDuring his entire term as Coordinator, Mr. Eastman participated in 17 proceedings in his regular capacity as Commissioner,
many of these being cases in which he had participated before his
appointment. Alpha Lux Co. v. Reading Co., 197 I. C. C. (1933),
In the MaHevol Automatic Train Control, 197 I. C. C. 29 (1933),
Capps v. Norfolk So. R. R., 197 I. C. C. 365 (1933), Lola Cement Mills
v. Atchison & S. F. Ry. Co., 197 I. C. C. 435 (1933), In re Automatic
Train Control Devices: S. P. Co., 198 I. C. C. 647 (1934), In the
Matter of Automatic Train Control Devices: Alton Railroad, 198 I. C. C.
657 (1934), Automatic Train Control: C. M. St. P. & P. Ry. Co., 200
I. C. C. 429 (1934), Appeal of Am. Barge Line Co., 200 I. C. C. 717
(1934), Pooling Passenger Train Revenues and Services: B. & M.
R. R., Me. C. R. R., C. N. & C. R. Rys., 201 I. C. C. 699 (1934), Am.
Trading Corp. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 201 I. C. C. 440 (1934),
Am. Lime & Stone Co. v. Penn. R. R., 201 I. C. C. 465 (1934) (dissent), Depreciation Charges of Carriers By Water, 210 I. C. C. 250
(1935), Pooling Ore Traffic in Wisconsin & Michigan, 210 I. C. C. 599
(1935), Lehigh Stone Co. v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., et al., 213 I. C. C. 537
(1936), Depreciation Charges of Sleeping Car Cas., 215 I. C. C. 597,
215 I. C. C. 629 (1936).
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But it is a fair conclusion that the cooperation between the two
agencies, and the mutual understanding, and the possibility of
the Commission's carrying on the Coordinator's work into the
future are all traceable in large part to this important fact, that
Coordinator Eastman was still a commissioner.
This leads into the interesting and difficult question as to
the effect of the existence of the Coordinator on the guiding
policies and the actual functioning of the Commission. On the
surface, (disregarding the superficial administrative disarrangements and rearrangements occuring during the three year
period), the Commission has continued to perform its function
without change of any kind, but this leaves unanswered the question whether there has not been a subsurface flow of some kind
which may have telling effect, stirred up by these temporary
operations on the surface. Under the Emergency Act the
Coordinator had broad power to assume a managerial function. 92 Under the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the
Transportation Act, the Commission had similar powers almost
as broad. 193 For example, paragraph 15 of Section 1 provides:
"Whenever the Commission is of opinion that shortage of equipment, congest of traffic, or other emergencies requiring immediate
action exists in any section of the country, the Commission shall have,
and it is hereby given, authority, either upon complaint or upon its
own initiative without complaint, at once, if it so orders, without
answer or other formal pleadings by the interested carrier or carriers,
and with or without notice, hearing or making or filing of a report,
according as the Commission may determine: (a) to suspend the
operation of any or all rules, regulations, or practices then established
with respect to car service for such time as may be determined by the
Commission; (b) to make such just and reasonable directions with
respect to car service without regard to the ownership as between
carriers of locomotives, cars, and other vehicles, during such emergency as in its opinion will best promote the service in the interests
of the public and the commerce of the people, upon such terms of
compensation as between the carriers as they may agree upon, or, in
the event of their disagreement, as the Commission may after subsequent hearing find to be just and reasonable; (c) to require such&
joint or common use of terminals, including main line track or tracks
for a reasonable distance outside of such terminals, as in its opinion
2 - Supra, pp. 201, 205.
'As to car service rules, Section 1(14); emergency control over
car service, terminals, and traffic arrangements, Section 1(15); routing over roads when necessary, Section 1(16) and Section 1(17); control over extensions and abandonments, Sections 1(18), (19), (20), and
discretionary power over them, extension of line or lines, Section
1(21); use of terminals by other carriers, Section 3(4); pooling of
freights, Section 5(1); physical connections rail lines and docks,
Section 6(13a); direction of traffic not routed by shippers, Section
15(10).
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will best meet the emergency an4 serve the public interest, and upon
such terms as between the carriers as they may agree upon, or, in
the event of their disagreement, as the Commission may, after subsequent hearing, find to be just and reasonable; and (d) to give directions for preference or priority in transportation,embargoes, or movement of traffic and for such periods as it may determine, and to
modify, change, suspend, or annul them...."

Commenting on the breadth and expansiveness of these powers
of the Commission, Professor Sharfman remarks :194
"In a very real sense the Commission becomes under such circurnstances the directing head of the railroadsystems. Except insofar
as the repeatedly expressed reference to the promotion of the public
interest must serve as a dominating guide, the Commission, as thus
empowered, in case of necessity, to suspend established practices, to
order the pooling of equipment, to require common use of terminals,
to direct traffic priorities, and to control the routing of shipments,
is virtually endowed with an uncharted discretion in removing service maladjustments and furthering general transportationneeds."

But the Commission has on very few occasions undertaken to
assume definitely managerial functions. It did go to what seemed
to be the extreme in Public Service Commission of Oregon v.
Ceifdral Pacific Railway Company'9 5 in ordering the construction
or 185 miles of railroad line in the Northwest. In another direction, that of wide-scale passenger-fare initiation, what many considered an extreme'01 was reached in Passenger Fares and Surcharges,'9 7 when the passenger rates of the entire United States
were ordered reduced to a scale of two cents a mile in coaches
and three cents, without surcharge, in Pullmans. Two Commissioners, one of them Commissioner Eastman, did not sit on this
case. Of the remaining nine, four dissented. To the determining assertion for the majority, speaking through Commissioner Porter that: lss
"if we have the power to set aside managerial discretion where the
latter seeks to impose an undue burden upon carriers generally by
an unwarranted reduction in rates, we must have the same power
where it is sought to effect a like result by maintaining an unwarrantedly high level of rates."
The Interstate Commerce Commission, Vol. 1, 238.
1-159 I. C. C. 630 (1929), set aside by the Supreme Court, 288
U. S. 14, 53 S. Ct. 266 (1933).
' See, for example, former Commissioner Thomas Woodlock in
the Wall Street Journal: "By its order... the Commission has at one
stroke undertaken to assume the last remaining function of management-that of initiating rates for service." 57 Traf. Wld. 773-774.
1-214 I. C. C. 174 (1936).

981bid., 230.
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Commissioner IMicNanamy answered :199
"I do not understand that the law gives us the authority to assume
managerial duties to the extent that is here proposed."

and Commissioner Lee :200
"This appears to me to be peculiarly a matter of managerial discretion."

Commissioner Lee seems to have agreed with the majority as
to the question of judgment, but agreed with the minority that
there was a fallacy in Commissioner Porter's opinion, which is
perhaps suggested by the words "sought to effect a like result,"
which seems to assume that there is no question at all that
reduced rates would not result in increased revenues. The indications are that Commissioner Eastman, had he been called upon
to vote, would have agreed with Commissioner Lee. 20 ' The other
two dissenters differed from the majority merely on the question
of judgment.
It is submitted that the treatment accorded this case on
the part of the Commission may possibly indicate a more aggressive stand on the borderline questions of judgment, and a greater
willingness to exercise the broad powers of management referred
to above. On the other hand, any attempt even to suggest an
adequate answer to this question would require a comprehensive
survey of all of the Commission's work in the light of a perspective furnished by time which is not available at present.
How much the Commission's emphasis has shifted and will
shift towards more of a concentration on problems of waste and
inefficiency on a national scale can be the subject for no more
than conjecture. 'While it was nearly inconceivable that in 1933
the Commission could have acted in recognition of the situation
of the railroads as a whole as an "emergency" within these sections, which would have been a strained construction both in the
light of the Commission's administrative history and the probable Congressional "intent" (specific recognizable open-andclosed situations had been visualized, such as war, car-shortage,
strikes, or a general railroad break-down in a particular area,
'"Ibid., 263. Contrast Commissioner Porter's language in his dissent in the Central Pacific Case, supra: "the State is not the
owner of the property and is not clothed with the power of management incident to ownership." 159 I. C. C. 630, 666 (1929).
-' Ibid., 265.
-Compare supra, p. 301.
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where particular railroads were concerned), is it any less inconceivable that it might have taken such action in 1936 or thereafter, had similar conditions arisen ?202
Public interest, and with it Congressional interest, in the
question of providing a permanent basis for the Coordinator's
work seemed to wane with the intensity of the emergency which
that work was originally intended to deal with. The President
had extended the effectiveness of Title I by proclamation on May
4, 1934, to allow the Coordinator an opportunity to finish studies
then in progress and to put some of them into practical application, 203 and at the time expressed the hope that further legislation would be forthcoming. A year later, after a hearing at
which the Coordinator testified that the railroads' benefit from
the work under the Act, already commensurate with the expense
involved, was just beginning, and at which the Association of
American Railroads opposed the extension on the ground that it
had now been superseded by the Association, which desired to
carry on the work of coordination, (without the restriction of
Section 7(b), Congress by joint resolution extended Title I for
another year. 20 4 In June, 1936, active support for the further
renewal was meagre. The labor executives, who had always been
primarily interested in Section 7(b), had now won their agreement for dismissal compensation, and so withdrew their support.
The railroads were for the same reason less concerned than ever.
" The appointment of Marion L. Caskie, the Coordinator's Southern Traffic Assistant to the Membership of the Commission will definitely tend to strengthen the carry-over of ideas and approach.
--ISenate Joint Resolution 112, 74th Congress, First Session,
extending the effective period of the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That Title I of the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933, shall continue in full force
and effect until June 17, 1936, but orders of the Coordinator or of the
Commission made thereunder shall continue in effect until vacated by
the Commission or set aside by other lawful authority, but notwithstanding the provisions of Section 10, no such order shall operate to
relieve any carrier from the effect of any State law or of any order of
a State commission enacted or made after this title ceases to have
effect.
Section 2. That it shall be the duty of each carrier to pay into the
fund provided for by Section 14 of the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933, within twenty days after June 16, 1935, $2 for every
mile of road operated by it on December 31, 1934, as reported to the
Commission, and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury
to collect such assessments.
-21
Senate Report 588, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., S. J. Resol. 112,
49 Stat. 376.
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Only the administration officers and the short lines, who were
interested in an uncompleted study of their problems and in the
extension of the proviso in Section 4 preserving joint routes,
came out definitely in favor. When no action was taken on the
regular measure for extension, Senator Wheeler in a desperate
last minute attempt to preserve the office until the next session of
Congress reported out an emasculated form of the Emergency
Act 20 5 on June fifteenth. Congress being otherwise occupied, no
final action was taken on this, and so, with little stir in any
quarter, the office of Federal Coordinator of Transportation
expired the next day, June sixteenth. 200
B.

Tim

JUDICIAL CONSRUCTIOTI

OF THE EMERGENCY ACT

The legal problems raised by Title I of the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933, while less significant perhaps
than some of the other problems which mark the story of the
Coordinator experiment, are important in any study of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation for two reasons. First, some
realization of their nature is essential to a full understanding
of the work actually done and the policies pursued as set forth
above. Second, they must be taken into account in connection
with any speculation as to the character and possible fate of any
similar legislation in the future.2° 7 Owing to the fact that in
S. J. 271, H. J. R. 615, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess.
On this date, June 16, 1936, there was approximately $20,000 of
the fund contributed by the railroads in the United States Treasury.
This the railroads contributed for the purpose of completing and publishing the remaining studies, of which there were four. (57 Traf.
Wld. 1190), (58 Traf. Wld. 5256). The direct cost of the maintenance
of the Coordinator's office to the railroads, who had been under duty
to pay on a mileage basis (supra, p. 204) was approximately $1,350,000
for the three years. This had been supplemented by special contributions from the Civil Works Administration totaling $650,000 for special studies in 1935. Statement made by Commissioner Eastman September 16, 1936, 58 Traf. Wld. 525. See also Hearings on Extension
of Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
7The cases dealing with Title I of The Emergency Act were:
Louisville & Nashville v. U. S., 10 Fed. Supp. 185 (N. D. Ill., 1934).
Quanah, Acme & Pacific v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 67 F.
(2d) 826 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933). See p. 94.
Atlantic Coast Line v. Hampton & Branchville R. R. Co., 80 F. (2d)
797 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936). See p. 94.
Texas v. United States, 292 U. S. 522, 54 S. Ct. 819 (1934). Holding that an order of the Commission approving a consolidation of offices and shops on the Texarkana & Fort Smith Railway should stand regardless of the Emergency Railroad Trans-
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only one instance was the action of the Coordinator challenged in
the courts, the discussion of these problems will necessarily be
centered around the one case which arose, 20 8 and their -wider
aspects expanded and outlined on the basis suggested by its careful and discerning opinion.
In Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., et al. v. United
States20 9 which came before the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, 210 the Louisville & Nashville Railroad sought to enjoin the enforcement of the Coordinator's one
major order.2 11 This was issued on October 25, 1934, on the
complaint of the Chicago and Eastern Railway, and directed the
portation Act, 1933, and of State statutes. Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes said:
"The broadening provisions of the Emergency Railroad
Transportation Act, 1933, confirm and carry forward the purpose which led to the enactment of Transportation Act, 1920.
We found that Transportation Act, 1920, introduced into the
federal legislation a new railroad policy, seeking to insure an
adequate transportation service. To attain that end, new
rights, new obligations, new machinery, were created.
(Cases.) It is a primary aim of that policy to secure the
avoidance of waste. That avoidance, as well as the mainte-

nance of service, is viewed as a direct concern of the public.
(Cases.) The criterion to be applied by the Commission in

the exercise of its authority to approve such transactionsa criterion reaffirmed by the amendments of Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933-is that of the controlling public interest. And that term as used in the statute is not a
mere general reference to public welfare, but, as shown by

the context and purpose of the Act, has direct relation to

adequacy of transportation service to its essential conditions
of economy and efficiency, and to approve private provision
and best use of transportation facilities. ..."

Powell v. United States, 12 Fed. Supp. 938 (S. D. Ga., 1935). In

sustaining an order of the Commission striking part of a tariff as
failing to compensate the carrier for an accessorial service, the Court
relied In part on Section 4 of the Emergency Act.

Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Hedges, 5 Fed. Supp. 752 (W. D.
Washington, 1933). Dismissing an application for an injunction
against a State excise tax. At p. 761, concurring opinion by Cushman, J., cites the Emergency Act to show the existence of an emergency in the railroad industry.
""Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., et al., v. United States,
10 Fed. Supp. 185 (Dist. Ct. N. D. Ill. E. D., 1934), hereinafter referred
to as "the Dixie Case".
"OIbid.
no Coram

Barnes, Evans & Sullivan, JJ. The action was brought
under Section 16 of the Emergency Act, which provides that the procedure set forth in the Urgent Deficiencies Appropriation Act (38 Stat.
219) for the review of Commission orders be followed in actions for
the review of final orders of the Coordinator.
uSupra, pp. 305 to 308.
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continuance of the through interchange of passenger equipment
on the "Dixie Route" between the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad and that line at Evansville, Indiana, and forbade the
establishment of a similar arrangement in substitution therefor
between the Louisville and Nashville and the New York Central
System. 21 2 The order, which had been issued only after a hearing by the three Regional Coordinating Committees (set up
under the Emergency Act) on the papers and oral testimony of
the railroads involved leading to no affirmative recommendation,
and only after thoroughgoing investigation by the Coordinator's
staff, rested on the conclusion that, were the Louisville & Nashville allowed to institute the change, wasteful duplication of
service and the elimination of an existing route213 would result,
since traffic considerations would justify the continued operation of the old train service by the Chicago & Eastern Illinois,
while, at the same time, operating considerations would compel
the New York Central to add to its previous service, in direct
contravention of the declared policy of the Emergency Act. The
attack on the order centered on two major contentions, that the
order was beyond the Coordinator's statutory authority, and
that it violated the due process clause of the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution. 2 14 There were no allegations in denial
of the Coordinator's conclusion as to waste, so that the issue was
not presented to the court on the merits but only on the question of legal power. The short answer given by the three-judge
court was that the issuance of the order was within the statutory
0 2 A temporary injunction had been granted by Judge Barnes,
whose court already had jurisdiction over the Chicago & Eastern
Illinois reorganization proceedings. No. 52, 871, printed in Brief for
Appellee, 64.
01 Section 4(1) (a) of the Emergency Act reads: "Avoid unnecessary duplication of services and facilities of whatsoever nature and
permit the joint use of terminals and trackage incident thereto or
requisite to such joint use: Provided, That no routes now existing
shall be eliminated except with the consent of all participating lines
or upon order of the Coordinator."
21 The case was argued on the pleadings, and the exhibits attached
thereto, which included (1) a history of the "Dixie route" service
from 1892 on (compiled by the counsel for complainants), (2) the
C. & E. I. Trustee's original letter of application to the Coordinator,
and his later memorandum, (3) the response of the three defending
railroads (N. Y. C., L. & N., and N. C. & St. L.) to the former, (4) the
Trustee's memorandum to the Coordinating Committees, (5) the report
of the Coordinating Committees, (6) the C. & E. I. Bondholders' Committee's intervening petition to the Coordinator, and (7) the Coordinator's Report and Order.
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authority of the Coordinator and since it found that an administrative question was involved and that the administrative procedure provided in the statute had not been invoked by the
plaintiffs it declared the case not yet "at the judicial stage" and
dismissed the bill. Thus the holding goes no farther than to
settle the pertinent questions of construction of the Emergency
Act and to apply the doctrine that one must exhaust one's
administrative remedy before resorting to the courts in controversies involving "administrative questions" under it.
The opinion deals with the latter problem at the outset. 216
Pointing out that the Act required the Commission to take some
action on a petition for review even though that be only to dismiss the appeal it then considered the various factors to be
weighed in the making of such an order-the financial condition
of the Chicago & Eastern fllinois the potential effect on it of
the deprivation of its chief source of passenger revenue, the
quality and effect of the service to be substituted by the New
York Central. Concluding that such matters clearly called for
determination by an expert administrative body the court followed without further discussion the closely analogous case of
United States v. Illinois Central Ralway,21 6 and accordingly
turned to the question of the Coordinator's statutory authority.
After an extraordinary understanding survey of the broad
outlines and general purposes of the Act 21 7 it was sought to
interpret Section 6(a), which reads in part:
"If, in any instance, a committee has not acted with respect to
any matter which the Coordinator has brought to its attention and
upon which he is of the opinion that it should have acted, under the
provisions of Section 5,218 he is hereby authorized and directed to issue
and enforce such order .

To the contention that the committees had "acted" in writing
their letter to the Coordinator, which asserted no positive position but rather one of "hands off", the court answered that this
was hardly "acting" and further that such nonaction should
not stand in the way of the Coordinator's power to order con-1 10 Fed. Sup. 185, at 191.

"'291 U. S. 457, 54 S. Ct. 471 (1934).
0

7

Pp. 191-192.

01 Section 5 makes it the duty of the Committees to initiate
"severally within each group and jointly where more than one group
is affected" action to carry out the purposes set out in subdivision
(1) of Section 4, as to which see note 213, supra.

K. L. J.-6
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ferred in Section 5, accepting, doubtless, the Government's con2 19
tention that, under the suggested construction,
"the functions of a Coordinator would be rendered futile."
To the contention that no words in the Act authorized the issuance of such an order, answer was made that the whole statute
gave such a meaning to Section 5 and 6(a) as to justify the
order, if it would prevent unnecessary duplication of services
and facilities and the elimination of a "route now existing"
without the consent of all participating lines, and as to these
it was held that such a finding was possible under the facts.
Finally, it had been urged in argument that no hearing had
been afforded the plaintiffs, and that this violated due process.
In reply, the court said :220
"This was a hearing and a determination of an administrative
question by an administrative officer.. .. "

and, accordingly, that administrative, rather than strictly
judicial, process would suffice.
A study of the opinion leads inevitably to three general
conclusions. The court assumed without discussion that the
whole body of administrative law as developed with reference to
the Interstate Commerce Commission applies as readily to question relating to the Coordinator arising under the Emergency
Act. Secondly, the court approached sympathetically the Act
as a whole, seeking to construe it in the light of its history,
nature, and background. Finally, the influence of the so-called
"emergency doctrine" is not imperceptible in the opinion: It
is submitted that, so far as these three propositions are concerned, the attitude of this court but reflects that of the modern
court, wherever it is sensitive to the innumerable pressures-economic, political, and social that, intruding, make to disrupt
the traditional judicial calm. Accordingly, it will be of value to
examine these conclusions in more detail and to suggest into
what provinces they lead.
In the first place, the court in dismissing the argument that
no proper hearing had been granted the plaintiffs was falling in
line with a well-established precedent as to the Commission
2
22

Brief for the Government, 8.
At p. 193.
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whereby in certain cases a hearing may be dispensed with. 22
222

Then by following the Illinois Central Case,

1

where an order of

the Commission was sustained without further review by the
Supreme Court because the machinery provided for administrative review had not been invoked, the court made applicable to
the Coordinator a doctrine, well-established in the many fields
of administrative law, 223 and closely akin to the doctrine of

"primary jurisdiction, "224 one of the fundamental doctrines
governing judicial review of Commission orders. 225 Where ade-

quate safeguards are afforded, court review of each act of judgment contributing to the final result is not indispensable 226 and
the opportunity for full review by the Commission of the Coordinator's entire action provided a fairly certain and complete
safeguard in this case. Before the Senate Committee, Commissioner Eastman had expressed this thought when he called the
proposed Coordinator just a "glorified examiner of the Commission".227 Furthermore, as this court recognized when it limited
2Avent v. United States, 266 U. S. 127, 45 S. Ct. 34 (1924),
sustaining a car service order of the Commission apparently issued
without a hearing, in accordance with Section 1(15) of the Interstate
Commerce Act. But see Southern Railway v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190,
54 S. Ct. 148, where the Court overthrew a state statute vesting in a
highway official power to determine the need for grade crossing elimination and to make the necessary order without a hearing as being
arbitrary. Three judges dissented.
2 Rupra, n. 216.
z2Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, 52 S. Ct. 617 (1932);
Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 20 S.Ct. 633 (1900).
21Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426,
27 S. Ct. 350 (1907), I. L. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, Vol. II, 393-406.
1-1
The doctrine was also applied to review of orders of the Shipping Board. See the comment of the Court in U. S. Navigation Co. v.
Cunard S. S. Company, comparing the Shipping Act of 1916 (39 Stat.
728) to the Interstate Commerce Act: "These and other provisions of
the Shipping Act clearly exhibit close parallelism between that act and
Its prototype, and the applicability to both of like principles of construction and administration." 284 U. S.474, 484, 52 S.Ct. 247 (1933).
" Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S.364, 27 S.Ct. 367
(1907); Mlonogahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S.177, 30 S.Ct.
35G (1910); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S.253, 25 S.Ct. 644 (1905);
and compare language of Hamilton, L. J., whose view was accepted
by the House of Lords (1915 A. C. 120), in Local Govt. Board v.
Arlidge, 1914 K. B. 160, 201, "There is no place here for a phrase that
was used in argument, namely, the appellant's 'common law right' to
stand before his judge," favoring a construction of a statute that set
up an administrative procedure for reviewing orders closing houses
unfit for habitation that provided neither for hearing of claimants (by
the reviewing board) nor for publication of orders which at the same
time greatly reduced the scope of court review.
n' Hearings, on Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, House
Com. on Int. & For. Commerce, 50.
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itself to the determination whether or not the findings of the
Coordinator could be supported "by the facts", even when court
review is permitted its scope is narrowed to question as to (1)
constitutionality, (2) statutory authority, and (3) certain subsidiary questions in essence comprising the test whether there
has been substantial as well as formal conformity with the underlying charter, 228 for example, whether there was evidence before
the administrative body from which its finding could be made, a
narrower question than is presented when the ordinary appellate
court reviews on appeal the action of a lower court. But there
is a limit beyond which courts will not go in narrowing the scope
of their own review, well expressed in the caveat uttered by
Mr. Justice Harlan some thirty years ago :229
"Suffice it to say, that the Courts have rarely, if ever, felt themselves so restrained by technical rules that they could not find some
remedy, consistent with the law, for acts, whether done by government
or by individual persons, that violated natural justice or were hostile
to the fundamental principles devised for the protection of essential
rights of property."' '

Arguments based on the interconnected doctrines of Separation of Powers and Delegation of Powers are seldom heard in
this present day where Commission action is being attacked.2 3'
Nor were they made in the Louisville & Nashville case, although
from the point of view of abstract political theory the Coordina= Interstate Commerce Commission v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 215 U. S.
452, 30 S. Ct. 155 (1910); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union
Pacific, 222 U. S. 541, 32 S. Ct. 108 (1912).
Monongahela Bridge Case, supra, 216 U. S. 177, at p. 195.
'10 It is quite possible that it was fear of "the doctrine of negative
orders" which led counsel in the Dixie case to resort to the courts in
preference to the Commission, for, had the Commission refused to
take action, this doctrine legalistically applied would have operated
to prevent any review by the courts. However, this uniquely would
have constituted a case for the application of the principle of the
quoted dictum. See Proctor & Gamble v. U. S., 225 U. S. 282, 32 S.Ct.
761 (1912). 2 Sharfman 406-417. It follows from the text above
that the established case law confirming the Commission's power to
enforce orders and to conduct investigations would also have been
carried over to reinforce the Coordinator's similar powers. See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 155 U. S. 1,
14 S.Ct. 1125 (1894).
2'In St. Louis & Iron Mt. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S.281, 28 S. Ct.
616 (1908), the Court disposed of the argument that there was
improper delegation to the Commission when it was given the power
to fix the uniform height for draw bars on freight cars throughout the
country very briefly and bluntly, citing the leading administrative
law cases on this point, Butterfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S.470, 24 S.Ct.
349 (1904), and the Union Bridge Case, supra, n. 226.
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tor's vested powers certainly represent an admixture of a rare
sort. If Mr. Justice Holmes' proposition that :232
"Legislation . . . looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some
part of those subject to its power...."

be accepted, the great bulk of the Coordinator's vested power was
"legislative "--his power to alter operating arrangements (as in
this case), to revise traffic and service practices, and to effectuate
terminal unifications and other coordination projects, all through
the power to order. To these must be added his broad power to
dispense laws, both State and Federal, a power of the broadest
nature. 233 And if it is agreed that the "judicial" function is
that in which he :234
"investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under the law supposed already to exist .. "
'Referring to the rate-making function, Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 226, 29 S. Ct. 67 (1908).
The dispensing power is well analyzed in E. Freund, "Administrative Powers over Persons and Property", 128-135. It is not an
unusual power even in democratic America, and its constitutionality
has been upheld several times, The Laura, 114 U. S. 411, 5 S.Ct. 881
(1885) (sustaining the Secretary of the Treasury's power to remit
penalties paid under a marine Inspection statute), Williamsport Wire
Rope Co. v. U. S., 277 U. S. 551, 48 S. Ct. 587 (1928) (assuming the
validity of provisions permitting the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
to relax the statutory mode of assessing taxes where it resulted in
undue hardship), Lehigh Valley v. U. S., 234 Fed. 682 (E. D. Pa.)
affirmed other jrds., 243 U. S. 412 (sustaining the power of the
Commissioner to relax the operation of the sections of the Panama
Canal Act (37 Stat. 568) as provided therein as to operation by the
railroads of competing water lines, other than through the Canal),
United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 290 Fed. 443 (Utah, 1923),
and New York Central Securities Corp. v. Interstate Commerce Com.,
54 Fed. (2d) 122 (S. D. N. Y., 1931), affd. other grounds, 287
U. S. 12 (sustaining the Commission's power to relax the anti-trust
laws In Section 5(15) of the Interstate Commerce Act). Although
such a power is usually extremely broad on its face, it is narrowed
considerably in its application by the requirement of exercise only in
conformity with the general lines of the statute in which it is found
and by the due process clause. In the intermountain Rate Cases, 234
U. S. 476, 34 S.Ct. 986 (1914), the power of the Commission to suspend
operation of the Fourth Section within its discretion was challenged
and met squarely as to these limitations, and while the opinion of
Chief Justice White appears to be guided by certain conceptualistic
ideas of delegation, there is evidence in the opinion that the decision
was dictated by other influential considerations: the impracticality
with dealing with that particular situation in any other way, the
expert nature of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the
increasing resort of government to administrative bodies similar to
it which was beginning to be noticeable at the time. The Court relied
heavily on the last of these, citing numerous cases.
2' Referring to the rate-making function, Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line Co., 211 U. S.210, 226, 29 S. Ct. 67 (1908).
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then his power to bring about the determination of just compensation for employee property losses resulting from coordination carrying out the purpose of the Act 235 and his power to
determine just compensation for use of carrier property or services in connection with orders issued 236 may be considered
"judicial."
Thirdly, the residuum of his functions and duties
may as well be called" administrative" or" executive" as by any
such demanding term, yet today an argument frankly based on
the abstract doctrine of separation of powers would hardly stand
one moment before the practical considerations to be urged on
the other side in defense of the Coordinator. 237 Therefore, the
basis of attack would have to be, as it was in a later case, 238 that
the delegation of power to the Coordinator was void for the lack
of the necessary standard. 239 It can be said that insofar as the
2

5Under Section 7 (d).
2 As provided in Section 8.
27But compare the following extract from the Brownlow Committee's Report of Jan. 8, 1937, referring to the independent regulatory commissions in the Federal Government:
"Those independent commissiofis have been given broad powers
to explore, formulate, and administer policies of regulation; they have
been given the task of investigating and prosecuting business misconduct; they have been given powers, similar to those exercised by
courts of law, to pass in concrete cases upon the rights and liabilities
of individuals under the statutes. They are in reality miniature independent governments set up to deal with the railroad problem, the
banking problem, or the radio problem. They constitute a headless
"fourth branch" of the Government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers. They do violence to the
basic theory of the American Constitution that there should be three
major branches of the Government and only three." Report of the
President's Committee, "Administrative Management in the Government of the United States," 36 (1937).
28Atlantic Coast Line v. Hampton & Branchville Ry. Co., 80 Fed.

(2d) 797 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).

2'Brief for appellant, 31-32. The limitations as to standards have
been recently discovered in two cases dealing with different sections
of the National Industrial Recovery Act (49 Stat. 195). An Executive
Order forbidding the transportation in interstate commerce of "hot
oil" issued under the statute which set little apparent limit on the
President's discretion was declared invalid in Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935), in which Chief Justice
Hughes declared: ".

.

. there are limits of delegation which there is no

constitutional authority to transcend. As to the transportation of oil
production in excess of state permission, the Congress has declared no
policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule." (430.) To
this Mr. Justice Cardozo in his dissent replied:

".

.

. the separation

of powers between the Executive and Congress is not a doctrinaire concept to be made use of with pedantic rigor. There must be sensible
approximation, there must be elasticity of adjustment, in response to
the practical necessities of government, which cannot foresee today
the developments of tomorrow in their infinite variety. The Interstate
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court did recognize the possible validity of the order in the
Louisville & Nashville Case, it implicitly recognized the validity
of the delegation as to this particular order. What standard
there was was provided in the main by the words of Section
4(1)--"avoid unnecessary duplication of services and facilities
... and avoid wastes and other preventable expense"-and by
the general structure and purposes of the statute. That "waste"
is an extremely broad word was clearly brought out in the Congressional committee hearings on the Act. 240 Yet it is no broader
than "reasonable", which has delimited the standard for the
Commission, the powers of which have been said to be "among
the broadest and least restrictive in the whole range of Interstate
Government,"' 2 41 in countless instances throughout its history,
and which has been worked out in accordance with the method
described by Judge Mfack :242
"To determine, however, the true meaning of the proviso, the
entire act must be examined. In the light of the other sections, and
of the legislative and judicial history of the clause, we are of opinion
Commerce Commission probing the economic situation of the railroads
of the country, consolidating them into systems, shaping in numberless ways their capacities and duties, and even making or unmaking
the prosperity of great communities . . . (cases)

is a conspicuous

Illustration.... What may be delegated to a commission may be delegated to the President." (440.)
The President's code-making power received similar treatment in
the Schechter case, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935).
21For example, John E. Benton, general solicitor of the National
Association of Railroad and Utility Commissioners, referring to the
possible effect of the exercise of the power to order on the work of the
State Commissions made the following statement before the House
Committee in the hearings on the Act:
"That (the language concerning waste and preventable expense)
Is wide enough to embrace any order or regulation whatsoever which
causes expense, which may be prevented by an order from the Coordinator...." (House Hearings, 133.) In similar vein is the statement
of H. R. Burford, general counsel for the Louisiana & Arkansas Ry.:
"It may be contended that the extraordinary power here conferred
will not be used. There is nothing to prevent it. No standard or rule
is prescribed and no line can determine whether it is guilty of
'waste' as used in the bill, either in securing or in the movement of
traffic." House Hearings, 258.
Commissioner Eastman at the time, when asked if the proposed
Coordinator would have authority to force salary cuts by executives,
replied:
"Well, those words are extremely broad, 'other wastes and preventable expense' . . . If he can translate that in his own mind into a
waste, I think he would have that authority." Senate Hearings, 57.
OuAnnotation to Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388,
55 S. Ct. 241 (1934), in 79 L. Ed. 446, at 509 (1935).
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that the guide to the exercise of the Commission's discretion Is to be
"
found in the other sections of the act ....

Under the Emergency Act a certain delimitation was
afforded by its general plan and purpose, a delimitation refined
by the specific limitations contained therein, of which there were
three, the labor restrictions, that as to the limitation of joint
routes, and that (confined to orders affecting State laws or regulations) requiring a finding of necessity for the order "to prevent or remove an obstruction to or burden upon interstate commerce.''243 As a conclusive indication of the reality of the
interrelation between the established course of decision as to the
Interstate Commerce Act and treatment accorded the Emergency
Act, the significant remarks of Commissioner Clyde B. Atchison

should be

cited:244

"The (Interstate Commerce) Act with its successive amendments
has repeatedly served as a model for other regulatory statutes, both
State and Federal. (Continuing in note.) The effect is to import into
application, and effect
such later acts of Congress the interpretation,
of the Interstate Commerce Act."2' s

With reference to the court's approach to the construction
of the Act, it is significant that a considerable proportion of the
opinion is given over to an exposition and analysis of its purposes
as reflected both in the words of Section 4 and in the broad lines
of the statute as a whole. Both in the interpretation of the
phrase "the committee has not acted" and of the phrase "to
avoid unnecessary duplication of service and facilities . . . and
in other wastes and preventable expense" the foregoing considerations were dominant. As to the elimination of an "existing
2,Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. U. S., 191 Fed. 856 (Com. Ct.
1911), at 860.
2 Section 10 (b).
'""The Evolution of the Interstate Commerce Act", L. Rev. 289,
304 (1937), 5 Ga. Wash.
2' There were a number of parallel provisions in two acts, which
should be noted, such as those relating to the coordination of transportation agencies generally (Section 4 of the Emergency Act and
Section 6(13) of the Interstate Commerce Act), the suspension of the
anti-trust laws and other conflicting statutes, state and fedreal (Section 10(a) and Section 5(15) respectively), the operating efficiency
of the carriers (Section 4 and Section 15a (both the old and the new)
respectively), the notification of and consultation with state authorities when their interests are concerned (Section 10(b) and Section
1(19) respectively), and to enforcement by the United States District
Attorneys (Sections 12 and 16(12) respectively). Jurisdiction to
review final orders of both Coordinator and Commission is conferred
by Section 16 of the Emergency Act and by the Urgent Deficiencies
Appropriations Act (38 Stat. 219).
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route", the court recognized that a narrower question was
raised, yet still a question to be settled by an administrative
agency. A different disposition had been made of the interpretation of this proviso in an earlier case, 246 where the question

was whether, after passage of the Emergency Act, a railroad
could discontinue on its own initiative 247 a through route and
joint rate with another carrier. The Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit had answered this in the negative,2 48 on
the assumption that the Congress had intended that the Act
should foster coordination and stabilize existing routes throughout the whole country without exception. The contrary view was
later taken in the Fourth Circuit, 249 where the court, supported

in its reasoning both by the analogy provided by a local coordination case in the Supreme Court, in which Section 11 was held
not to have affected the scheme previously sanctioned by the
Commission under Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 250

251
and by administrative interpretation by the Coordinator's staff
2 52
and by the Commission,
relied on the contrast between the
temporary measure enacted in Title I and the permanent nature

2 Quanah, Acme & P. Ry. Co. v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
67 Fed. (2d) 826 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933), noted in 34 Col. L. Rev. 777
(1934).
24
Under Section 6(3) of the Interstate Commerce Act.
- Note 246, supra.
Atlantic Coast Line v. Hampton & Branchville Ry. Co., 80 Fed.
(2d) 797 (1936), noted in 31 Ill. L. Rev. 107 (1936).
mTexas v. United States, 292 U. S. 522, 54 S. Ct. 819 (1934).
In reply to a request for an official ruling on the question
Charles E. Bell, Executive and Traffic Assistant to the Coordinator,
answered by letter as follows: ". . . the prohibitions therein against
eliminating routes without the consent of all participating carriers,
or upon order of the Coordinator, are merely limitations upon the
powers, duties, and functions set forth in the Emergency Act, and not
general provisions intended to modify the Interstate Commerce Act.
To take any other view would mean that each and every participating
carrier in every tariff published in the United States would have the
right to appeal to the Coordinator before it could be eliminated from
any tariff. Manifestly, that was not the intent and the Coordinator
has not the machinery to investigate and pass on all such situations."
Letter to E. M. Yarborough, Gen. Frt. and Pass. Agt., South Georgia
Ry. Co., Quitman, Ga. Nov. 30, 1934, printed at pp. 27-28 of the brief
for the appellant in Atlantic Coast Line v. Hampton & Branchville
R. R. Co., supra.
2 In a proceeding under Section 1(18) in which the Brotherhood
sought to have conditions imposed in accord with Section 7(b) of the
Emergency Act upon a carrier which was seeking to consolidate its
operation, the Commission ruled:
"Our jurisdiction under the Emergency Act applies only after the
Coordinator has issued an order ..
" Chicago, Great Western Railway Trackage case, 207 I. C. C. 315, 318 (1935).
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of the amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act in Title II.
No court was called on to construe the vital Section 7(b)
of the Emergency Act, although the Coordinator felt called on to
issue his interpretation of it on two occasions. The first was
favorable to the railroad employers and was published when he
was seeking to stimulate carrier action during the first month of
his administration, and the second, one less favorable to the
carriers when he was seeking to combat their "ghost" committees set up merely to evade the restrictions of Section 7.253 In
mExcerpts from this statement follow:
Section 7(b) of Title I of the emergency railroad transportation
act, 1933, contains restrictions on reduction in the number of employees
in the service of a carrier and in their compensation "by reason of any
action taken pursuant to the authority of this title." I have expressed
the view that these restrictions do not apply to any lawful action
taken by individual carriers or by carriers jointly which does not
result from any authority conferred by the act or involve the use of
any agency or mechanism which it creates, and to this opinion
I adhere ....
It appears, however, that in each region the carriers have also
created a general committee which is separate from the regional
coordinating committee, and that the duties of these general committees are much the same as those which the act imposes upon the
regional coordinating committees, i. e., to search out means of avoiding waste and preventable expense and promote voluntary action by
the carriers to this end. The plan seems to be that these general
committees shall function independently, and that the projects which
they consider shall not be brought to the attention of the regional
coordinating committees or of the Coordinator unless voluntary action
by the carriers proves impossible. This is with the thought, I take it,
that any economies which the carriers may be able to accomplish In
this way with the help of the general committees will not be subject
to the labor restrictions of Section 7(b)....
I know that the general committees were instituted prior to the
passage of the act, or trace their lineage to committees which were
finally emerged as the emergency railroad transportation act, 1933, and
it seems clear that these committees would, but for the provisions of
Section 7(b) have been merged with and in the regional coordinating
committees.
It is, of course, important that entire good faith should be maintained with the President and Congress, whose will is reflected in
Section 7(b), and that anything which savours of evasion should be
avoided. From this point of view, I can not escape the conclusion that
projects for economy which are found to require consideration by
committees representing the carriers of any region collectively should
be handled as the act contemplated that they would be handled,
namely, through the agency of the regional coordinating committees
which are understudies or substitutes therefor.
With a view to accomplishing this result, I deem it my duty now
to refer to the regional coordinating committees for investigation and
report all projects within their respective regions which are embraced
under certain general heads listed in the appendix hereto. They cover
matters which, as my regional directors have found, the general committees are now investigating or propose to investigate. They do not
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treating it any court would have necessarily been limited in its
desire to give full and sympathetic construction to the Act by
the established canon that, where possible, that construction must
be adopted which avoids the possibility of constitutional invalidity. 25 4 The paragraph in question provided:
"The number of employees in the service of a carrier shall not be
reduced by reason of any action taken pursuant to the authority of
this title below the number as shown by the pay rolls of employees in
service during the month of May, 1933, after deducting the number
who have been removed from the pay rolls after the effective date of
this Act by reason of death, normal retirements, or resignation, but
not more in any one year than 5 per centum of said number in service during May, 1933; nor shall any employee in such service be
deprived of employment such as he had during said month of May or
be In a worse position with respect to his compensation for such
employment, by reason of any action taken pursuant to the authority
conferred by this title."

On the one hand, lay the possible construction urged by the railroads, that the effect of (1) the position of the provision in Title I
and (2) the words "by reason of any action taken pursuant to
the authority of this title" was to limit its application to
instances where formal action was taken through the machinery
provided by the Act.2 55 On the other hand, lay the Coordinator's
construction, that wherever joint carrier action was taken, the
effect of which was to run afoul of these provisions, and the purpose of which on the part of the carriers was to evade them, they
would be applicable. 256 In between lay a great expanse of
middle ground. Under any of these constructions a constitutional issue would be raised, yet the intensity with which it could
be urged would vary with the breadth of the construction
adopted.2-5 7 On the one side there would be the danger of a
include projects which may be undertaken by individual railroad systems in ordinary course of management, but are confined to projects
which require coordinated action by two or more separately operated
carriers. Nor do they include projects which have been consummated,
or those which are about to be consummated under arrangements
which have been completed. The object which I seek to achieve is
that the regional coordinating committees shall assume the leadership and responsibility which the act intended that they should
assume, and take charge of the general committees.
2'Interstate Commerce Commission v. Oregon-Washington R. Co.,
288 U. S. 14, 53 S. Ct. 266 (1933).
MR. V. Fletcher, "Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933",
13 Ore. L. Rev. (1934).
See Coordinator's statement to Regional Coordinating Committees.
57The Constitutional questions raised by the labor provisions and
by the general power to order are governed by similar considerations.
Unification and coordination orders would be authorized under the
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practical emasculation of the statute, and on the other all the
dangers inherent in anything done in the name of the law that
looks like the coercion of employers to employ. 258 In sum, while
it may be assumed that the sympathetic approach of the court
in the Dixie case toward the Act would generally be prevalent
commerce clause. ("As their (the railroads') service is vital to the
nation, nothing which has a real or substantial relation to the suitable maintenance of that service, or to the discharge of the responsibilities which inhere in it, can be regarded as beyond the power of
regulation ....
Hughes, C. J., dissenting (with whom Justices Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo concurred) in Railroad Retirement Board v.
Alton Railroad, 295 U. S. 330, 375-376, 55 S. Ct. (1935), which declared
a comprehensive pension system for railroad employees not regulation
of interstate commerce; see also dissenting opinion of Cardozo, J., in
which Brandeis and Stone, JJ., joined, I. C. C. v. Oregon-Washington
R. Co., supra, n. 254 (where the majority narrowly construed Section 1
of the Interstate Commerce Act to deny the Commission power to
order a 185 mile extension of line). But it is not clear that restrictions of the power to discharge employees at will would be so authorized, even though attached to a measure offering encouragement and
sanction to voluntary railroad action in self help. On the one side
would be such cases as the Railroad Retirement Case, supra, and on
the other the Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 4, 32 S. Ct. 1
(1912), Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 S. Ct. 293 (1917), and the
recent cases sustaining the Wagner Labor Relations Act, 57 S. Ct. 615,
57 S. Ct. 642, 57 S. Ct. 645, 57 S. Ct. 648, 57 S. Ct. 650 (1937).
The area of validity under the due process clause cannot be definitely delineated, yet a suggestion is offered as to its rough bounds by
the Wolff Packing Co. Case, 262 U. S. 522, 43 S. Ct. 630 (1932), in
which the Court rejected a comprehensive scheme resting upon a system of compulsory arbitration in labor relations, even though there
was a local emergency situation involved, and by the instances gathered together by Mr. Justice Roberts in the Nebbia Case, 291 U. S.
502, 529, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934) where restrictions on "absolute freedom" in the employer-employee relation have been sustained (at
page 527).
To them should be added, among others, cases sustaining restrictions on the employer's right to deal with his employees except
through their freely chosen representatives, Texas & N. 0. v. Brotherhood, 281 U. S. 548, 50 S. Ct. 427 (1930), extended in Virginian Ry. v.
System Fed. No. 40, 57' S. Ct., 592 (1937), to sustain a court order
under the Railway Labor Act requiring an employer to "treat with"
the duly certified representatives of his employees. In the last analysis, as far as the due process clause is concerned, each case goes on
its own peculiar facts and is dominantly affected by the temper of the
court at the particular time (see inLfra. pp. 353-354.
=In reliance on the proviso in Section 12 "that nothing in this
title shall be construed to require any employee or officer of any
carrier to render labor or service without his consent, or to authorize
the Issuance of any orders requiring such service, or to make illegal
the failure or refusal of any employee individually, or any number of
employees collectively, to render labor or services," the defending railroads (Louisville & Nashville, Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis, and
New York Central) had argued to the Coordinator that his order
would result in such enforced service. They did not raise the argument before the District Court, however.
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as to most matters of construction suggested by it, a definite
limitation must be recognized in those instances where the danger
of unconstitutionality was thought to be present.
First year law students are always taught the catching
phrase "danger invites rescue." It is the intention to ponder
'259
here the similar phrase "emergency creates (legal) power."
Throughout the opinion in the Louisville & Nashville case there
are evidences that the fact of emergency was very real to its
writer. 200 In discussing the broad purposes of the Act, which
were at one point stated to be
"to administer oxygen to critical patients and to revive those who were
suffering from sinking spells ...."

and in liberally interpreting its words, the court lived up to its
recognition that
"this act is clearly remedial in character, and should be construed
accordingly.....

by according full weight to the fact of the emergency situation
in which it had been enacted. While as here construction may
be equally influenced by the element of emergency, strictly
speaking, the so-called "emergency doctrine", is concerned with
constitutional power. Wilson v. New 2 6 1 best sets this forth, for
present purposes. In that case action was brought to enjoin the
enforcement of the Adamson Act, 2 6 2 passed in response to an

urgent message by President Wilson on the eve of a nation-wide
railroad strike. Arbitration had failed, the nation was threatened by war, and the establishment of an experimental readjustment of wages by the device of shortening the day from ten hours
to eight while still requiring the same per-day rate to be paid
for a short period of time appeared to be the only means of
averting disaster. In turning aside the attack of unconstitutionality A,r. Chief Justice White discussed the broad nature of
the power conferred and the direct interest of the public in the
subject-matter concerned, examining with care each detail of the
situation to meet which the legislation had been enacted. It is
J. P. Clark, "Emergencies and the Law", 49 Pol. Science Quar
terly 268 (1934); other articles cited in 2S Law Library Journal 25.
"' "Generally speaking, a study of it (the Act) warrants the conclusion that it was enacted to save certain railroads from bankruptcy
and to perpetuate an efficient means of interstate transportation in
the United States." 10 Fed. Supp. 185, 191, 191-192, 193.
243 U. S. 332, 37 S. Ct. 298 (1917).
"-39 Stat. 721.
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not clear whether the Chief Justice was referring to the commerce power or due process when he said, 263 in answer to the
assertion that the emergency cannot be made the source of
power:
"The proposition begs the question, since, although an emergency
may not call into life a power which has never lived, nevertheless
emergencies may afford a reason for the exercise of a living power
already enjoyed."

Furthermore, the holding was carefully limited to the exact set
of facts of the case, with the result that in recent cases the doctrine could be cited on one side,2 64 and then on the other 2 8
without materially affecting the actual result reached by the
Court.2 66
Without doubt the particular exigencies of the situation in
the Wi7lson Case governed the decision as they did in the Rent
Cases,267 and in the Minnesota Moratorium Case.26 s Courts have
often given recognition to the existence of the depression which
witnessed the birth of the Emergency Railroad Transportation
Act, 1933.2039 In the light of recent experience with "the judicial
process" and of the considerations set forth above, it is difficult
to conceive that any court would not be influenced to some extent
in its approach to the Act by the special considerations raised
in the case before it. In so doing, whether it phrased the result
in those terms or not, it would be acting well within the established precedent sometimes called "the emergency doctrine".
And even though a court be of a temper to sustain legislation in
more normal times surely invalid, there are limits beyond which
it cannot go. On the one hand is the famous warning sounded
0At p. 348.
""Home Building & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398,
54 S. Ct. 231 (1934).
Schechter v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935).
mMr. Powell comments on the latter case:
"Formal in the
extreme was the rejection of all saving grace in emergency. Could the
Court but find it there, it could with ease have said that in troublous
times the local so affects them that the relation between them is direct
and close ....
The Court went a way it chose and not a way
compelled." "Commerce, Pensions, Codes", 49 H. L. R. 1, 219 (1935).
-''Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 S. Ct. 458 (1921); Marcus
Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 S. Ct. 465 (1921).
" Note 264, supra.
'0 See Brandeis, J., in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S.
262, 306, 52 S. Ct. 371 (1932).
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in Ex Pane Milligan,270 which invalidated action taken under
an unjustified declaration of martial law:
"The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.
No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever
Invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be

suspended during any of the great exigencies of government ..

"

which may or may not mean anything, depending on numerous
factors outside the scope of this paper, except perhaps that no
matter how serious the emergency, blatant and frank disregard
of Constitutional provisions will not be sanctioned by the Court.
On the other hand, is another obvious limitation, well stated in
Chastleton Corporationv. Sinclair,271 a case declaring invalid
the Rent Law in the District of Columbia succeeding that sustained earlier in Block v. Hirsh :272
"A law depending on the existence of an emergency or other state
of facts to uphold It may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or
the facts change even though valid when passed."

Just who decides when the emergency is over and when "the
facts have changed" presents a number of further problems.
However, although there has been improvement in the railroad
industry and a great deal of progress has been made, it is submitted that the disease has not been wholly rooted out as yet, and
that accordingly this limitation would be less significant in the
present connection. The Coordinator's experimental status, his
power to affirmatively manage the railroads, to remake adjustments, to affect labor relationships, to control individuals, all
these and many more would have to have been tested out case by
case, situation by situation, adjustment by adjustment, before
any satisfactory conclusions would lie. Of the satisfaction of
possessing such, fate has forever deprived those who are still
curious enough to seek a certain answer, yet the possibility lies
ahead that at some time in the future new light will be reflected
back by new happenings.
Out of a great need has come an undeniable demand for
action to attack the transportation problems of the American
nation. A germinal idea, prevalent in the minds of thoughtful
students of these problems both at home and abroad, formulated
4 Wall. 2, 120, 121, 18 L. Ed. 281 (1866).
"'Per Holmes, J., 264 U. S. 543, 44 S. Ct. 405 (1924).
Z0

- 2See

n. 267.
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in terms of the incomplete yet not wholly insignificant experience
of American railroad men up to that time as modified to satisfy
the forceful demands of labor and of localism, was embodied in a
statute, the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933. Its
administration was entrusted to a man as able, as experienced,
as highly respected, and as closely connected with its evolution
as there was to be found. He brought to it a carefully worked
out philosophy of administration, which left no room for arbitrariness and very little for atffrmative management on the part of
the regulatory body. Supported by an expert and well-organized
staff, the Federal Coordinator of Transportation, striving for a
full and sympathetic application of the common sense principles
developed by his studies and expounded in his reports, undertook
to achieve this more through the informal and penetrating device
of persuasion than through orders. The Act itself set up a
framework to facilitate this process, which framework was later
supplemented by the Association of American Railroads, itself
one of the tangible results, direct or indirect, which flowed undeniably from the Coordinator's work. Another was a number
of coordination projects, terminal unifications and others, which
were carried into execution in various parts of the country, and
another the tremendous stimulus received by thought on railroad
and regulatory problems throughout the land. Still another was
the carefully worked out program of legislation submitted to the
Congress, some of which was to be adopted immediately and some
of which was to furnish the basis for further proposals and later
action. Perhaps most significant of all was the high standard
of thought and action, a standard tempered by a national
approach, both as to operating problems and service and regulation and labor relations, which was brought to and permanently
instilled in that all-conditioning environment in the modern
economy, the railroad world, by the endeavors of Coordinator
Eastman.
With many aspects of such an administrative agency law
courts are little concerned, particularly when it has established
a high reputation for itself. Yet they do stand ever ready to protect "fundamental rights" whenever occasion arises. Even an
agency primarily devoted to the service function can violate its
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basic charter, and when it is given the power to make affirmative
orders, it is essential that some technique carefully evolved in
experience be provided to secure a constructive adjustment of
the conflicting interests. Louisvfle & Nasiwile v. United States
illustrates how the one court that did pass on such an order did
avail itself of the well-formulated body of judicial experience
that has been evolved in connection with the Interstate Commerce Act, without sacrificing any of the distinctive features of
the Emergency Act or disregarding the dimly outlined spectre of
constitutionality which lurked in the background. It gave full
effect to the policy behind the Act by adopting a construction
of ambiguous language which accorded full play to the Coordinator, in striking illustration of the modern tendency of courts
to recognize that the exigencies of governmental administration
are not to be dealt with legalistically on a basis of abstract logic
or grammar but with a full view to the situation and the process
involved as the whole. The meaning of "law" expands and the
sharp difference between the philosophy of the judge and that
of the administrator continues to disappear, though their functions remain distinct. Accordingly, the study of the legal background of the Coordinator permits one to peek into the future
a little more confident of the trend administrative law is
following.
To conclude, the comparatively small experience and effectiveness of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation, an experimental agency created in times of great economic emergency, has
contributed far more than its share to the history of our time
and will stand ever in a place of importance and influence with
relation to later developments in governmental administration
and administrative law. The Coordinator's achievements are but
the bases for extensive future action. His ideas, while but slowly
accepted, will inevitably lead to improvements on a plane never
before directly reached by our government. His organization
and technique have opened the way for many other experiments
yet to come. Carefully organized, conscientiously administered,
with standards always of the highest, constructively contributing
to the growth of the law in its function and capacity of developing the interests of the whole people to the fullest, yet with due
I K.

L. J.-7
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concern for the interest of the individual, Coordinator Eastman's
agency has demonstrated what man's government at its best
can do.278
(Concluded)

Besides the general sources consulted in the preparation of this
paper, I have found the following publications of the Coordinator particularly helpful:
A List of the Prepared Addresses, Questionnaires, Reports, and
Miscellaneous Statements of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation, June 16, 1933, to June 16, 1936. (Mimeographed.)
Reports to Congress:
First Report, Sen. Doe. 119, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., Jan. 20, 1934;
Second Report, Sen. Doc. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., March 10, 1934;
Third Report, House Doe. 891, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 23, 1935;
Fourth Report, House Doc. 394, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., Jan. 21, 1936;
Fifth Report (Unemployment Compensation), unprinted, April 7, 1936.
Summary of the Work of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation under the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933, June,
1933, to June, 1935. (Multigraphed.)
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